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A person’s worldview might moderate the way a persuasive message is processed, 
sometimes in the opposite direction of that intended by communicators. This dissertation 
explored the possibility that a worldview can influence the way a persuasive message is 
perceived.  
 Building on the construct of worldview, the heuristic-systematic model of persuasion, 
and terror management theory, this dissertation examined the question in a between-
participants post-test only 2 (expertise cue) X 2 (argument quality) X 2 (mortality salience) X 
a relativist worldview (a measured variable) experiment (N = 149). Some participants in the 
experiment were reminded of their eventual death, while others were asked to think of 
watching television. Then, participants’ tendency toward a relativist or traditional worldview 
was assessed. Participants viewed mock ads that featured either strong or weak arguments 
and had either an expertise cue or no cue at all, after which they rated the ads in terms of 
their attitudes toward the ad (Aad), the attitudes toward the brand (Abrand), and behavioral 
intentions.  
 Worldview had a main effect on global evaluations of the ads, such that participants 
who tended toward a relativist worldview had lower evaluation of the ads and lower 
behavioral intentions. Mortality salience was found to moderate participants’ worldview, 
presumably making their worldview more accessible in evaluating the ads. This dissertation 
iv
also found separate main effects for worldview and argument quality on attitude toward the 
ad and attitude toward the brand, respectively. The implications for the heuristic-systematic 
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Chapter I 
Introduction and Theory 
 
Robert, Sandra, and Sara were reading magazines at a coffee shop one morning, and 
Robert noticed an ad for a new artificial sweetener. The ad touted the product as having 
superior taste and health benefits and being especially designed for gourmet cooking. The ad 
also featured a picture of Martha Stewart, widely reputed as an expert in home and garden 
matters, and said that she designed the sweetener based on her extensive experience. The 
product was also tested rigorously in her laboratories. 
Robert was persuaded by the ad. “Someone with as much knowledge and experience 
as Martha Stewart must know what she is talking about,” he said. “That’s how progress is 
made, through innovation and testing.”  
Robert was generally optimistic about the advances of science and believed that 
progress through science and technology was good. He usually took seriously the advice of 
experts in most areas of his life, taking advantage of their objective and usually unbiased 
perspective. 
Sandra, on the other hand, was more skeptical, saying that she would need to try the 
sweetener first-hand before being convinced.  
“How do you know that what she’s saying is really true?” Sandra asked. “Of course, 
she says it’s superior. She’s selling it.” 
2Sandra placed as much stock in her own opinions as she did in experts’ opinions, 
which, in her mind, is what they were: opinions, not facts. No one could be truly objective. 
Sara looked up from reading an article about Patsy Cline, the promising country 
singer whose life was cut short in a plane crash.  
“You’re right,” she said. “How can we know if anything is real? I wouldn’t even try 
it.”  
Sara shared Sandra’s conviction about the uncertainty of expert knowledge, but today 
she seemed more adamant. 
“Laboratory studies are so biased anyways,” Sara said. “First, saccharine was 
supposed to be a healthy alternative, until reports of cancer in laboratory animals surfaced. 
Then, aspartame was promoted as being better, but it has some kind of vague warning about 
phenylketonuria, whatever that is. I’m sure it’s just a matter of time before harmful side 
effects are discovered for this product, too.” 
Her friends returned to their magazines, but Sara continued. “Cellphones are 
convenient, but you can get a brain tumor; modern agriculture feeds millions but ravages the 
environment; margarine was better than butter, now it’s worse than butter. How can we 
really know anything anymore?” 
After a pause, Sara ordered another mocha latte, her favorite, but this time with 
whole milk and extra cinnamon. 
 
Robert, Sandra, and Sara responded differently to the same persuasive message, and 
their responses varied according to the fundamental assumptions they made about life in 
general. Robert believed that society was moving forward to a better and brighter future, and 
3that scientific development was an important reason for that progress. It is possible for 
experts, and people in general, to be unbiased and objective. Robert was more persuaded by 
the ad because the message, with its strong assertion of superior results claims of laboratory 
testing and expert experience, was in line with his assumptions about life.  
Sandra, on the other hand, did not hold Robert’s conviction that experts are 
necessarily better informed. She realized that some reputed experts could be mistaken and 
others could be biased by personal concerns such as profit. The ad’s claims of Martha 
Stewart’s authoritative expertise, therefore, did not ring true to Sandra. 
Sara tended to share Sandra’s perspective regarding the impossibility of certainty or 
objective and value-free knowledge. However, Sara had just read about the untimely death of 
a singer, and that article had prompted anxious concerns about her mortality. The anxiety 
caused her nonconsciously to defend her worldview, her understanding of how the world is, 
and because the influence of her worldview had been heightened, it had a greater influence 
over the way she perceived the ad.  
Sara’s worldview was similar to Sandra’s, but anxiety over the possibility of death 
caused Sara’s worldview to have greater influence in her response to the ad. Sara resorted to 
her habitual patterns of thought about the world and habitual patterns of behavior, ordering 
another of her favorite coffee beverage. Perhaps Sara’s worldview was more available at the 
time because she needed a buffer against anxiety, or it could be that the anxiety just led her to 
engage more in her learned patterns of behavior and thought. Regardless of the reason, 
though, the increased availability of Sara’s worldview led her to process the ad differently 
than either Sandra or Robert. 
4A persuasive media message can be perceived in different ways, depending, in part, 
on the worldview, or basic assumptions about reality, of the person receiving the message. In 
addition, situational factors, such as a reminder of one’s mortality, can make a person’s 
worldview more available and applicable for influencing how a message is interpreted. The 
image of Martha Stewart was intended to activate an implicit belief that experts like Martha 
Stewart can be trusted. However, among readers like Sandra and Sara, whose relativist 
worldview included a general distrust of experts, the image did not have the intended effect. 
Persuasion research has been a vibrant arena of study since the 1950s, particularly in 
its relation to attitude research (Johnson, Maio, & Smith-McLallen, 2005). Persuasion has 
received substantial research attention in such diverse disciplines as communication (e.g., 
Dillard & Pfau, 2002; O’Keefe, 2002), psychology (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986), and marketing (e.g., Bettman, 1979; Friestad & Wright, 1994; Howard & 
Sheth, 1969), and has informed scholarly work in fields such as political science and public 
health.  
A desire for greater insight in the 1970s led to a focus on the mental processes that 
fuel persuasion, and the introduction of dual-process theories of attitude change in the 1980s 
enabled researchers to make great gains in understanding persuasion and attitudes (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 2005). Dual-process models maintain that attitude change occurs through two paths. 
One path—the central, systematic, or conscious route—is via the careful scrutiny and rational 
evaluation of a persuasive message’s arguments. Processing via the second path—the 
peripheral, heuristic, or nonconscious route—relies on quick judgments that allow a person to 
reach a decision without having to expend considerable mental energy on analysis. 
5Building on dual-process theories, researchers have studied the influence of a number 
of individual differences on persuasion (Briñol & Petty, 2005; Oliver, 2002), including a 
preference for complex thinking (Cacciopo & Petty, 1982), a need to reach a firm decision 
quickly (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), 
personality, and culture (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998). The number of 
dimensions on which people can vary is virtually without limit, but many shared 
characteristics on which people differ include demographic characteristics such as age, 
ethnicity, or gender, or psychographic characteristics such as values, attitudes, and lifestyles. 
Research based on the heuristic-systematic model (HSM) has begun to recognize the 
influence of core beliefs and assumptions—what this dissertation terms a worldview—on the 
processing of persuasive messages (Giner-Sorolla, Chaiken, & Lutz, 2002; Pomerantz, 
Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995). Indeed, some formulations of the HSM explicitly note the 
potential role of centrally held beliefs as the basis for forming judgments (Chen & Chaiken, 
1999), but the construct of centrally held beliefs has not been explicated fully enough for it to 
play a larger role in the theory. A worldview, which comprises what Chen and Chaiken 
described as centrally held beliefs, is a set of core a priori assumptions about reality with 
which a person perceives and interprets surrounding events and information (Koltko-Rivera, 
2004; Naugle, 2002). 
Differences in how people process information may have an important bearing on 
how they communicate. As researchers seek to develop more comprehensive theories of 
human communication, it becomes essential to consider these fundamental individual 
differences. This task is especially important when considering a concern common to much 
of social science research, namely that of small effect sizes (Oliver, 2002). In the course of 
6explaining the importance of their experimental manipulations, researchers too often 
acknowledge but promptly ignore larger and more powerful social forces that bear on the 
results of their study (Oliver, 2002). Thus, a large portion of the variance in typical 
experimental studies remains unexplained. Even if including worldview variables increases 
the variance explained by 5% to 10%, the effort would be worthwhile (Koltko-Rivera, 2004). 
Persuasion scholarship has seen a growing body of research that explains how individual 
differences, such as personality traits or cognitive styles, lend greater insight to a theoretical 
understanding of attitudes and behavior.  
Thus far, research has rarely examined the role of an individual difference similar to 
worldview in the heuristic-systematic model in persuasion, nor has it fully examined what 
might cause one’s worldview to become more accessible. Consumers are being bombarded 
by innumerable persuasive media messages, some of which, naturally, are more effective 
than others. An understanding of the reasons why people respond in different ways to the 
same message, and why some people pay more attention to some messages than others will 
help researcher understand the condition under which some effects occur (Oliver, 2002). 
Incorporation of worldview as an individual difference variable in media effects research 
holds promise for shedding more light on an important dimension on which people vary, 
explaining how Robert, Sandra, and Sara can see the same persuasive message and be 
affected in different ways. 
 
Purpose 
This dissertation explores the possibility that a worldview can influence the way a 
persuasive message is perceived. Building on the heuristic-systematic model of persuasion 
7(Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989), this dissertation tests if a relativist 
worldview can moderate how persuasive messages are processed. A person who has a 
relativist—sometimes referred to as a constructivist—worldview believes that truth is 
contextual and norms are situational and that personal experience—and not abstract universal 
principles—is the basis for determining what is real (Berzonsky, 1994; Gergen, 2001).  
This dissertation has several goals. One, it aims to contribute toward theory 
development by illustrating the possible role of worldview as a moderator in the heuristic-
systematic model, because a person’s response to cues such as source credibility might 
depend on one’s worldview. Research in the model has noted the importance of the belief 
structure into which attitudes are embedded (Pomerantz et al., 1995), but this finding has 
received relatively little systematic attention. Chen and Chaiken (1999, p. 79) also urged 
further research in the multiple motives framework of the model, and this dissertation hopes 
to contribute toward that end. The multiple motives framework posits that the way a person 
processes a persuasive message can vary depending one which motive is most salient. In 
addition to wanting to have a valid and accurate attitude toward a topic presented in a 
persuasive message such as an ad, individuals are motivated at times to impress other people 
or to defend their existing self-identity and worldview. In some regards, the defense 
motivation parallels the key mediating mechanism of terror management theory, namely, 
existential anxiety that leads to the defense of one’s cultural worldview. This dissertation 
explores that point of connection between the theories in an advertising context. 
Likewise, this dissertation highlights the importance of worldview as an antecedent 
variable in media effects research that can yield greater insight into communication processes 
(McLeod, 2001). Advances in communication models, particularly those that aspire to be 
8useful in several fields such as political communication or health communication, will 
require specifying cognitive and motivational variables that influence media use and the 
processes of media effects. In the field of political communication, for example, McLeod 
suggested that broader moderators of media use, such as worldviews and values, likely 
influence political communication and said that such variables should be explicated and 
incorporated into the models. In that vein, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate how 
worldviews can shed light on cognitive processes central to communication theory. 
This dissertation also responds to the call for a greater appreciation of epistemology 
in social psychological experimental research (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002). Understanding the 
social context in which people move is essential for understanding their thoughts and 
behavior. Jost and Kruglanski highlighted several promising developments, including the 
recognition that a shared social reality is essential for a meaningful interpretation of stimuli. 
Cultural psychology, they said, represents a successful effort toward integrating experimental 
social psychology and insights from social constructionism. By taking into account personal 
epistemology in social psychology, researchers stand to gain a deeper understanding of 
human cognition and behavior. 
For U.S. young adults, controlling for gender, ethnicity, and need for closure, what is 
the relationship between an expertise cue (present, absent), argument quality (strong, weak), 
mortality salience (present, absent), and a relativist worldview and measures of advertising 
effectiveness? This relationship is examined via a post-test only 2 (expertise cue, within 
participants) X 2 (argument quality, between participants) X 2 (mortality salience, between 
participants) X a relativist worldview (a measured variable, between participants) mixed-
factorial experiment.  
9This chapter first explicates the construct of worldview and its relationship to dual-
process models of attitude change and terror management theory. Based on the review of the 
literature, several hypotheses and research questions are proposed. Chapter 2 details the 
experimental procedures and describes the stimulus materials and dependent variables used 
to test the hypotheses. Chapter 3 presents the results of the experiment. Chapter 4 discusses 
the findings and their theoretical implications, addresses limitations, and offers potentially 




A worldview is a set of assumptions about physical and social reality that shapes the 
way a person perceives and interprets the world (Koltko-Rivera, 2004; Naugle, 2002). A 
worldview also provides a sense of meaning to reality and guides the inferences a person 
draws from what he or she experiences (Koltko-Rivera). These core constructs, or a priori 
assumptions, form the foundation for knowing and understanding, guiding cognition and 
behavior. McLeod, Sotirovic, and Holbert (1998) described worldviews as basic beliefs about 
how the world works. McLeod, Kosicki, and McLeod (2002) defined worldviews as a 
person’s “lay theories about the world around them” (p. 239) and said a worldview can be 
descriptive—how the world is—or normative—how the world ought to be. In this 
dissertation, a worldview is defined as a chronically accessible collection of core 
assumptions or beliefs, often unconscious and untested, with which a person makes sense of 
the world. The core beliefs and epistemological assumptions subconsciously shape how other 
thoughts are organized and employed (Koltko-Rivera). The beliefs that make up a worldview 
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are often socially constructed and culturally bound, being formed by language and social 
interaction (Naugle). The social environment in which a person’s worldview develops has an 
enduring effect on the perception of media content and how the content is processed.  
Worldviews could be considered higher-order constructs that are distinct from lower-
order constructs such as attitudes. As Chaffee (1991) noted, if social attitudes are defined as 
enduring predispositions, one should not expect much change or variance. Studies of 
“attitude change,” then, would be an oxymoron, if that definition were employed. Chaffee’s 
observation highlighted the need for a clear explication of constructs. Attitude has been 
employed to denote everything from values, as in Rokeach’s (1968, 1974) value-attitudes, to 
mutable opinions (Wyer & Albarracín, 2005). Theoretical clarity requires a well defined 
explication of a construct and its relation to other antecedent or consequent constructs 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
Concern with worldviews and their constituent beliefs is not unique to mass 
communication, however. The concept is found in many disciplines, including cultural 
anthropology, theology, and philosophy (Naugle, 2002). In psychology, cultural worldview 
has been posited as a mediating mechanism in terror management theory (Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Greenberg et al., 2003). The construct also parallels to some 
degree personal core constructs (Kelly, 1955), lay epistemologies (Kruglanski, 1989), folk 
epistemology (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998), epistemological beliefs 
(Schommer & Walker, 1995), implicit theories (e.g., Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Levy, Plaks, 
& Dweck, 1999; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998), and implicit cultural theories (Chiu, 
Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000). Koltko-Rivera’s (2004) extensive explication of worldview 
11
in social psychology defines a worldview as a set of core assumptions about the nature of 
reality that form the foundation of values and attitudes.  
Scholars have long recognized the importance of people’s fundamental beliefs and 
how those beliefs might influence how people perceive the world. Worldviews and the core 
dimensions that they comprise (Kotlko-Rivera, 2004) are analogous to Wittgenstein’s (1972) 
idea of world picture and icons/narratives, to Kuhn’s (1996) paradigm and exemplars, and to 
Lippmann’s (1922) pseudoenvironment and stereotypes (Figure 1), each of which is 
discussed in the sections that follow. 
 
Wittgenstein 
The concept of worldview, or Weltanschauung, was introduced by Kant and often is 
translated as “philosophy of life” or left intact in German. The term denoted a general 
perspective that made sense of the world. Wittgenstein, as he explored how language shapes 
the way people think and behave, sought to move away from the idea, as expressed in 
Hegel’s writing and common in philosophy, that a Weltanschaaung inherently competed 
against others to be the most accurate and all-encompassing view of the world. Instead, 
Wittgenstein posited that a “world picture” [Weltbild] is learned in childhood and serves as a 
framework for a person’s thoughts, values, and actions. The interpenetration of human 
activity (“forms of life”) and words (“language games”) formed the foundation of a person’s 
experience and understanding as they, Naugle (2002) said, “embody and express the 
fundamental features and categories of the world” (p. 157). A world picture creates a 
person’s reality in that it represents reality and also “forms one’s way of seeing and 
conceiving of the world, and understanding its fundamental character” (p. 158). In addition, a 
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world picture is not acquired after its testing or evaluation. Wittgenstein writes in On 
Certainty (1972), “But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false” (p. 15e). A world picture is 
not a rational analytical system of thought, in a Cartesian sense, and it is not necessary for it 
to be thoroughly consistent internally. It is, rather, an icon-based way of experiencing the 
world and making sense of it. Thus, a worldview could be expected to have greater influence 
on heuristic processing of information than on systematic or analytic processing. 
Wittgenstein (1972) employed the metaphor of a lens to describe the function of a 
world picture. As a lens filters what the eye detects, so also a worldview shapes one’s 
perception of reality, influencing which events are noticed and which ones are ignored. 
Wittgenstein also employed the metaphor of a riverbed to describe the relatively fixed nature 
of world pictures. Statements describing a world picture can be conceived as a mythology, 
coherent narratives that may or may not correspond to reality. “The mythology may change 
back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the 
movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the river-bed itself; though there is 
not a sharp division of the one from the other” (p. 15e). This distinction is similar to the 
distinction in psychology between thought process and thought content. The construct of 
worldview refers to the riverbed that guides cognition. For Wittgenstein, a world picture 
functions at two moments. At the moment of perception, it is a lens, influencing what a 
person sees. Once the target has been perceived, the world picture functions as a riverbed, 
guiding the flow of thoughts as a riverbed shapes the course of the water. 
13
Thus, a worldview, like a lens, can influence how people persuasive message such as 
an ad, and how people might respond to different arguments or cues. When worldview 
functions as a riverbed, it can also influence thought processes, such as the degree to which 
people engage in careful systematic analysis of a message and heuristic processing. 
 
Kuhn 
Like Wittgenstein, Kuhn (1996) sought to integrate social influence and thought, 
though at a societal level, with an explanation of the community-based development of 
scientific knowledge. Kuhn defined a scientific paradigm as an understanding of reality that 
unifies inquirers and sets the direction of research. When its explanatory and predictive 
utility is stretched beyond capacity, the paradigm is replaced in a wholesale fashion by a new 
one. Kuhn drew an important distinction between events in the world and perceptions of 
those events. The perceptions can vary according to language or culture or social group: 
 
Notice that two groups, the members of which have systematically different 
sensations on receipt of the same stimuli, do in some sense live in different worlds. We posit 
the existence of stimuli to explain our perceptions of the world, and we posit their 
immutability to avoid both individual and social solipsism. About neither posit have I the 
slightest reservation. But our world is populated in the first instance not by stimuli but by the 
objects of our sensations, and these need not be the same, individual to individual or group to 
group. To the extent, of course, that individuals belong to the same group and thus share 
education, language, experience, and culture, we have good reason to suppose that their 
sensations are the same (Kuhn, 1996, p. 193). 
 
In a paradigm, knowledge is embedded in shared exemplars, archetypal images that 
shape what is perceived and what is ignored. The exemplars themselves carry meaning and 
shape perception. Exemplars give a person the ability to process information, grouping 
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situations as being like some and unlike others. Kuhn’s notion of exemplars was unlike its 
use by much of social psychology (e. g., Smith, 1998). Social psychology researchers use 
exemplars to refer to concrete examples, whereas Kuhn used the term to denote abstract 
archetypal ideals. For many social psychologists, events that share characteristics of a 
population of similar events function as exemplars. Exemplars are representations of actual 
instances and help people store more specific information than do abstractions (Smith, 1998). 
For Kuhn, however, exemplars are not so-called classic examples in that exemplars are not 
concrete. Rather, exemplars transcend particular instances of events or objects. An object 
might be considered to be a classic example if it closely resembles an exemplar, but such an 
object would not be the exemplar itself. In that regard, Kuhnian exemplars resemble 
culturally based heuristics that can shape how a person understands a persuasive message. 
Unlike Wittgenstein and social psychologists (e.g., Bandura’s Social Cognitive 
Theory, 2001), Kuhn did not consider cognitive processes to occur after perception. Instead, 
interpretation occurs concurrently with perception, Kuhn (1996) argued, writing, “What I 
have been opposing in this book is therefore the attempt, traditional since Descartes but not 
before, to analyze perception as an interpretive process, as an unconscious version of what 
we do after we have perceived” (p. 193). Perception, for Kuhn, is not an active evaluative 
thought process, but an instantaneous or automatic action shaped by exemplars. Like 
Wittgenstein, Kuhn sought to move away from a Cartesian conception of perception as a 
rational analytic process. Kuhnian exemplars, then, subconsciously shape what is noticed and 
valued in a message and what is ignored or discarded as anomalous, much like 
Wittgenstein’s lens metaphor. Unlike Wittgenstein, however, Kuhn apparently would not 
employ the riverbed metaphor to describe the function of a paradigm.  
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Cues in a persuasive message can trigger the application of exemplars through which 
a person perceives the message. An image of a laboratory scientist, for instance, might be 
perceived differently, depending on the meaning attached to that archetypal image. 
 
Lippmann 
Focus on constructs analogous to worldview is not a new development in mass 
communication theory. Decades earlier, Lippmann (1922) had noted that people’s 
understanding shapes their perception of the world. With his famous phrase “the pictures in 
our heads,” Lippmann distinguished between reality and people’s perception of the world, 
inserting between a person and the environment a “pseudo-environment,” a mental 
representation of the environment. People act on their mental models of reality rather than 
reality itself.  
Because people have limited experience, Lippmann said, very few of a person’s 
mental images are based on direct observation. Much of the inventory of mental pictures can 
be socially constructed, either received from other people or constructed by the individual. 
Although the images reside in the individual, they are the property of the society in which the 
person lives. Meaning is embedded in the socially constructed mental pictures, which may 
vary in the extent to which they represent the world.  
Stereotypes, abstract archetypes of the world, simultaneously represent and distort 
external reality, and Lippmann employed the term “stereotype” instead of platonic ideals, 
because he considered the word to be more value free (p. 104). Lippmann’s use of the term 
predates voluminous research in social cognition on stereotyping, the use of categories to 
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attribute traits to people, particularly with regard to ethnicity (Allport, 1954). Lippmann’s 
definition of stereotypes bears substantial similarity to Kuhn’s exemplars in that they carry 
meaning and shape perception. Lippmann wrote, “For the most part we do not first see, and 
then define, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the 
outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive 
that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture” (p. 81). These 
stereotypes, or exemplars to borrow Kuhn’s term, form what Wittgenstein would call world 
pictures. The hallmark of a perfect stereotype, Lippmann wrote, “is that it precedes the use of 
reason; is a form of perception, imposes a certain character on the data of our senses before 
the data reach the intelligence” (p. 98). Like exemplars, stereotypes are not part of an 
interpretive cognitive process that occurs after perception, but constructs that precede it. 
Lippmann argued that understanding the pictures in a person’s head is a prerequisite for 
understanding behavior.  
The constellation of the pictures in one’s head constitutes a worldview. The core 
dimensions on which worldviews vary usually include beliefs regarding human nature, the 
relationship between human beings and nature, one’s orientation toward time, the possibility 
of certain knowledge, the organization of social relations, and causality (Dalbert, Lipkus, 
Sallay, & Goch, 2001; Ibrahim & Owen, 1994; Koltko-Rivera, 2004).  
Any number of worldviews could be examined, limited only by the means at one’s 
disposal for operationalizing the worldview. Available measures include the Attitudes About 
Reality Scale (Unger, Draper, & Pendergrass, 1986), the Scale to Assess World Views 
(Ibrahim & Owen, 1994), the Constructivist Assumptions Scale (Berzonsky, 1994), and the 
Organicism-Mechanism Paradigm Inventory (Germer, Efran, & Overton, 1982). The General 
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Social Survey (Davis, Smith, & Marsden, 2004) has included items to measure respondents’ 
worldviews. A battery of seven items (denominated “World Image”) probed foundational 
beliefs such as fatalism, theism, causality, and human nature. In mass communication, 
McLeod, Sotirovic, and Holbert (1998) operationalized three worldviews: a just worldview, a 
belief that people are treated fairly in the world; a fatalistic worldview, a belief that a person 
cannot change events; and a knowable worldview, a belief that the world can be known and 
that a person can change matters. 
 
A relativist worldview 
This dissertation focuses on one worldview, relativism, sometimes referred to as 
social constructivism or social constructionism. It is important to note that “social 
constructionism” has at least two current definitions. Social constructionism (Feldman & 
Lynch, 1988) is the term used to refer to the phenomenon that many self-reported responses 
to probes of attitudes toward issues, values, and preferences do not really exist a priori in a 
given respondent until that person is forced to provide an answer. In these instances, 
responses to previous questions, contextual cues, and other factors influence the responses 
that are given subsequently. In that regard, the responses are socially constructed and are not 
true indicators of actual internalized values or attitudes. The second definition of social 
constructionism is synonymous with social constructivism (Berger & Luckman, 1967; 
Gergen, 2001), which holds in its radical form that reality does not exist, there are only 
perceptions of reality which are formed by society. Something is true if everyone in a society 
agrees that it is so. The less radical form of social constructivism maintains that although 
reality may exist, one’s perceptions of it are socially conditioned and absolute objective 
18
knowledge is impossible. Thus, values and standards of behavior are the product of a given 
society and, therefore, are relative, not absolute, in their applicability. It is this second 
definition that is employed in this dissertation to describe a relativist worldview. 
Social constructivists, people who hold a relativist worldview, maintain that 
observations, descriptions, and norms are the product of the society or culture in which one 
lives (Gergen, 2001). Therefore, truth is contextual and socially determined, not universal. 
Constructivists believe each person can and should play an active role in developing a sense 
of identity (Berzonsky, 1994; Gergen, 1991). However, that role extends beyond forging a 
self-identity; in every area of existence one must play an active role in determining what is 
true. A person who has a relativist worldview tends to value the self as the source of 
knowledge but maintains that no one can have absolute or certain knowledge. In a relativist 
worldview, absolute objectivity is impossible, and one person’s perspective is just as valid as 
that of another. Facts themselves have no inherent independent meaning; they derive 
meaning from the interpretation that one gives them. 
Such relativist epistemological assumptions lead one to discount the credibility of 
expert knowledge. Authorities are fallible, as is human reason in general. Intuition and affect 
are valid ways of knowing, and knowledge gained through personal experience trumps any 
categorical claim. Universal pronouncements and abstract propositional principles are 
discounted. Any claim of certain knowledge, therefore, is suspect. Further, the enterprise of 
science is value-laden and cannot be wholly objective.  
In general, a layperson’s opinion or belief is just as valid as that of a recognized 
expert. Thus, one can expect that a persuasive message based on an expertise heuristic might 
be interpreted quite differently from what the communicator had intended. For example, the 
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expertise heuristic that advertisers assumed they could activate, “Experts’ statements can be 
trusted,” would instead be the opposite, “Experts’ statement cannot be trusted.” Instead of 
giving the message added credibility, such an appeal would be ineffective in an audience that 
is characterized by a relativist worldview. Further, a strong persuasive argument that relies 
on an appeal to universal principles is likely to be discounted. 
If a worldview is chronically accessible, it should have a general influence over what 
one sees and how one makes sense of what one perceives. Because it is unclear at this point 
if such a worldview will have a main effect on the global evaluations of the ads, the 
following research question is proposed: 
 
RQ1: What effect, if any, will a relativist worldview have on the global evaluations 
of persuasive ads? 
 
A relativist worldview is characterized by a conviction that absolute objectivity is 
impossible and that scientific knowledge is fallible. Further, because truth is relative and 
dependent on context, the validity of universal propositional statements is suspect. Therefore, 
a relativist worldview should attenuate the effectiveness of ads employing a strong argument 
based on propositional statements or ads featuring an expertise cue. 
 
H1: A relativist worldview will exhibit an inverse relationship to evaluations of ads 
containing an expertise cue. In other words, the more relativist one’s worldview is, 
the less favorable one’s evaluation of persuasive messages that feature an 
expertise cue are. 
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H2: A relativist worldview will exhibit an inverse relationship to evaluations of ads 
containing a strong propositional argument. In other words, the more relativist 
one’s worldview is, the less favorable one’s evaluation of persuasive messages 
that feature arguments based on propositional statements. 
 
Evaluations of the persuasive messages will be lower among participants who have a 
relativist worldview. One’s chronically accessible worldview will be considered applicable, 
or diagnostic, and function as a lens through which one evaluates both arguments and 
heuristic cues. 
 
The dynamic nature of worldviews 
Conceptions of worldview as a filter tend to portray worldview as a chronic 
disposition. This dissertation, however, borrowing from cultural psychology (Briley, Morris, 
& Simonson, 2000; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000), adopts a dynamic 
constructivist approach to worldviews. That is, although worldviews are rather stable and 
enduring over time, their effect in a particular situation is dynamic, depending on the cues 
that might heighten their influence. Although a worldview is chronically accessible, any 
number of factors may temporarily increase the worldview’s accessibility. In addition, 
features of the object of one’s attention could function as cues to make the available 
worldview deemed relevant or applicable in forming an opinion regarding that object. 
People’s fundamental patterns of thought or “complex conceptual structures” such as 
deep cultural ideologies can be primed nonconsciously (Bargh, 2006). Culturally or 
nationally based ways of thinking can be primed by national symbols or by language itself 
(Aaker, 2000; Nisbett, 2003). Cues in a message, for example, could make one’s worldview 
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more accessible and relevant to the message at hand, thereby influencing how information is 
processed. A person’s worldview could function as a source of heuristics primed by 
situational cues. Given this possibility, one model that is particularly relevant in explaining 
this relationship in the context of persuasion is the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, 
1980; Chaiken et al., 1989). 
 
Heuristic-Systematic Model of Persuasion 
 
The heuristic-systematic model of persuasion (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken et al., 1989) is 
a dual-process account of attitude change. Persuasion occurs through one of two paths. A 
person can process information systematically through effortful analysis, through the 
application of heuristics that require substantially less effort, or through a combination of 
both. While one engages in conscious elaborative thought in the systematic route to reach an 
accurate conclusion regarding an object, in the heuristic route one employs “mental 
shortcuts” or takes cues from characteristics of the message to develop a valid attitude 
(Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken et al., 1989). Persuasion that occurs via the systematic route is held 
to be more enduring because the arguments are integrated into one’s existing cognitive 
structure (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Persuasion that occurs on the basis of cues is more 
ephemeral, either decaying after time or being highly susceptible to change when confronted 
with counterarguments. 
To engage in systematic thought, a person must be both able and motivated to do so. 
When cognitive resources are available, (and under conditions of high involvement) one will 
engage in systematic analysis. When cognitive resources are burdened, one is less able to 
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conduct elaborative thought and will rely instead on cognitive shortcuts for developing an 
attitude toward the topic. Dual-process theories largely assume that systematic processing 
tends to be objective and rational and that heuristic thinking is more likely to be biased. If 
people engage in effortful rational analysis, they will reach objective and true conclusions, 
although heuristic processing can exert a biasing influence on systematic processing 
(Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). 
 
Co-occurrence  
 Although systematic and heuristic paths are described as separate modes that co-
occur, they are not independent of each other with regard to their influence (Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994; Chen & Chaiken, 1999). The model makes several predictions deriving 
from relative differences in the strength of systematic and heuristic processing. When 
systematic and heuristic information is congruent and both paths exert somewhat equivalent 
levels of influence, their effect is compounded, a result predicted by the additivity hypothesis.
For example, a strong argument can lead a voter to have a positive attitude toward a 
politician, and an endorsement by a political expert can lead to an even more favorable 
attitude toward that politician. When the effect of heuristic cues is strong and arguments are 
weak or ambiguous, the heuristics will bias systematic processing, an effect predicted by the 
bias hypothesis. Bias occurs in this instance when the unfavorable effect of weak arguments 
for a politician is offset by an endorsement by an expert political observer. When systematic 
and heuristic information is incongruent, processing from one path might reduce the effect of 
information processed via the other route, which is labeled the attenuation hypothesis. The 
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favorable effect of a strong argument for a politician might be reduced if it were paired with 
an endorsement by a public figure suspected of political corruption.  
Chen and Chaiken (1999) maintained that heuristic processing entails some level of 
awareness, unlike the Barghian notion of implicit processing, in which many cues never enter 
a person’s consciousness (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). In the heuristic-systematic model, 
observers normally must be aware of the cue in order to perceive it, but they need not be 
aware of the activation of the heuristic or their processing of information. Heuristic 
processing can be started by cues in either the message or the communication context, but in 
addition to being triggered by situational cues, heuristics may also be triggered by internal 
information, such as observers’ mood states or opinions. Such internal or dispositional cues, 
Chen and Chaiken noted, are more likely to spark nonconscious heuristic processing.  
An example of a heuristic cue is source expertise (e.g., “Experts’ statements can be 
trusted”), which Chaiken et al. (1989) suggested would lead a person to form a positive 
attitude toward a target without evaluating systematically all of the information available. If a 
person believes that an expert source lends credibility to a message, then that person might 
devote less effort to analyzing the message itself, accepting its validity based on the 
associated source. 
For a heuristic to function, the mental shortcut must be internalized and available in 
memory. In addition, the heuristic must be accessible in a particular persuasion episode. The 
accessibility of a heuristic can be influenced by internal traits or states, or the setting can 
include cues that will activate the heuristic. Further, a particular heuristic must be diagnostic 
or be deemed relevant enough to exert influence on the information at hand.  
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Heuristic processing is more likely to occur in conditions of low involvement. A 
person in a state of low involvement has little motivation to exert enough effort to analyze a 
message systematically. Thus, when a person is unwilling to scrutinize an advertising 
message a cue in that message can activate a heuristic that will be used to evaluate the 
product favorably (or unfavorably). Under conditions of high involvement, a person is 
motivated to analyze a message systematically and will be less likely to depend largely on 
mental shortcuts to make an evaluation. 
 
Multiple motives 
Although the model was developed initially (Chaiken, 1980) based on a single motive, 
that of holding an accurate and valid attitude toward an object (accuracy motivation), the 
model subsequently (Chen & Chaiken, 1999) was expanded to include several motives, 
which can be dispositional or situational. Chen and Chaiken outlined three motivations: 
accuracy, impression, and defense. These motivations are not exclusive, but one might take 
primacy over the others in any given context. In some cases, a person’s primary goals are 
social, namely to manage one’s impression on other people. The impression motivation might 
derive from social norms or from social goals. When impression is a primary motivation, it 
will influence the application of some heuristics over others to serve a given social goal. An 
impression motivation can be induced by telling a study participant that after reading an 
argument he or she will have to discuss the issue with someone who holds a strong opinion 
on that topic. The participant is then motivated process the information in a way that will 
allow him or her to manage the impression he or she makes on the other person. A defense 
motivation derives from the intent to maintain and bolster one’s material interest and the 
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attitudes and beliefs that are closely linked with one’s sense of self. Chen and Chaiken cited 
values, a social identity, and personal characteristics as self-definitional beliefs that a person 
might seek to defend.  
 
Antecedent traits 
Although the bulk of heuristic-systematic research focuses on the two processing 
modes, researchers have noted that some antecedent traits exert an influence on both modes. 
A person’s ideology, for example, can influence both heuristic and systematic processing 
(Giner-Sorolla et al., 2002). A deep structure of core beliefs and assumptions can form a 
foundation for some attitudes and opinions and make the attitudes less malleable. Some 
attitudes are resistant to change, therefore, because they are embedded in a larger structure of 
values, ideologies, identities, and knowledge (Pomerantz et al., 1995). Thus, the systematic 
elaboration of a message might not be enduring if the goal of the message is to produce an 
attitude that is incongruent with one’s existing belief structure. This also suggests that one’s 
worldview should exert an influence on both systematic and heuristic processing, and not just 
the heuristics employed. Of course, many attitudes may not be rooted in core beliefs, but 
instead are constructed as needed (Feldman & Lynch, 1988) and therefore be susceptible to a 
number of dispositional and contextual factors. In these instances, one’s worldview might be 
diagnostic for constructing attitudes on issues where none had existed. 
When people process heuristically, they invoke inferential rules, “learned knowledge 
structures,” “implicit beliefs,” or stereotypes, either consciously or not, to make evaluations 
or reach decisions based on a minimal amount of information (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Chen 
& Chaiken, 1999). Subjective experiences are a source of heuristic processing, but for the 
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experience to have a judgmental impact, the observer must have some “theory” (p. 87) with 
which to interpret information. An individual’s theory, which Chen and Chaiken defined as 
“previously learned judgment rules” (p. 87), is triggered by one’s subjective experience and 
becomes a heuristic that is applied in a given situation.  
In the heuristic-systematic model, a worldview might be classified as a dispositional 
or internal source of heuristics that, like theory, enables one to make sense of one’s 
experience. Although the construct of an internal theory parallels in many respects that of 
worldview, a worldview is trans-situational and much broader than what Chen and Chaiken 
(1999) defined as learned rules for evaluating a particular situation. A worldview is not 
learned, in an active sense; much of a worldview, like implicit cultural theories (Chiu et al., 
2000), is acquired via culture and language. Thus, a given group of people can share a 
particular worldview, which can be characteristic of a culture or subculture. While each 
individual might have an internal theory or set of rules for making judgments that develops 
according to personal experience, which results in as many theories as there are individuals, 
many people can be characterized by a common worldview.  
If worldview is akin to the notion of a person’s internal theory in the heuristic-
systematic model, then it could be a source of heuristics. However, worldview might also be 
an antecedent variable to the persuasion process and not a source of heuristics but rather a 
dispositional trait that influences the availability, accessibility, and diagnosticity of heuristics. 
Belief structures, as described by Giner-Sorolla et al. (2002), are not a source of heuristics; 
they are traits that influence the effectiveness of a given persuasion effort. Further, if 
worldview is solely a source of heuristics, then it should not affect systematic processing in 
the absence of heuristic cues. 
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Because the systematic and heuristic modes are independent, one mode is not held to 
moderate the other. Instead, they have a joint, or net, effect. A cue does not amplify the effect 
of an argument, it merely adds to it. In many studies of additivity, attenuation, or bias, the 
cue is presented before the argument. Participants are told that the communicator is an expert 
(e.g., a college professor) or a nonexpert (e.g., a high school senior) before they proceed to 
read an argument about a given topic (e.g., comprehensive exams). Thus, the cue and 
arguments are presented sequentially. In this study, however, the arguments and cues are 
presented simultaneously, as in the Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) study, which used ads 
for an answering machine. 
The additivity hypothesis of the heuristic-systematic model predicts that the effect of 
systematic information and heuristic cues will be compounded when they are congruent. 
Therefore, evaluations of ads containing both an expertise cue and a strong argument should 
be higher than those of ads containing either a strong argument or an expertise cue alone, all 
of which should be higher than evaluations of ads containing a weak argument and no 
expertise cue.  
 
H3: Evaluations of ads containing both an expertise cue and a strong argument will 
be stronger than those of ads containing the expertise cue alone or a strong 
argument alone. 
 
The additivity hypothesis, tested in H3, holds that the congruency of systematic 
information and heuristic cues will compound their effect. However, a relativist worldview 
should moderate their individual effects, as predicted in H1 and H2. It is uncertain what 
would be the net result of the product of the additivity hypothesis and a relativist worldview. 
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The relationship of expertise cue, argument quality, and worldview leads to the following 
research question: 
 
RQ2: Will a relativist worldview moderate the joint effect of both an expertise cue 
and a strong argument? 
 
Of course, one’s worldview is not the only dispositional factor that influences how 
persuasive messages are processed. Any number of individual differences can affect one’s 
attitudes toward a persuasive message. It is possible, also, that people form differing attitudes 
toward an advertisement and the product it promotes, particularly if people draw on their 
experience with other attempts at persuasion. Instead of one general attitude, people might 
form separate attitudes toward the topic of a message and the source of that message. One 
model that explains this phenomenon is the persuasion knowledge model (Friestad & Wright, 
1994). 
 
Persuasion Knowledge Model 
 
The persuasion knowledge model (Friestad & Wright, 1994) has a broader scope than 
dual-process theories such as the elaboration likelihood model and heuristic-systematic 
model. The model seeks to explain other types of knowledge present in a persuasion attempt 
and how this knowledge might influence responses to a persuasive message. A target is the 
person toward whom a persuasion attempt is directed, such as a consumer. An agent is the 
entity responsible for the persuasion attempt, such as a salesperson, or a company. A 
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persuasion attempt denotes any effort toward attitude change and includes an ad, a message, 
or a campaign. 
 Like the heuristic-systematic model, but unlike the elaboration likelihood model, the 
persuasion knowledge model assumes that people have more than one motivation. People are 
motivated to hold a valid topic attitude, but they also can be motivated to hold a valid agent 
attitude. The salience of these goals may be mixed. For example, in a given situation a target 
might be highly motivated to hold a valid attitude toward a particular agent and less 
motivated to develop a valid attitude toward a topic. The persuasion knowledge model leaves 
open the possibility that targets may have more than these two goals. Other goals could 
include maintaining high self-esteem or earning the admiration of another person (which 
parallels the impression motivation in heuristic-systematic model). 
 Targets and agents have three types of knowledge. Topic knowledge, the traditional 
concern of dual-process theories, concerns information related to the product. Agent 
knowledge concerns information related to a company or sales representative. Persuasion 
knowledge concerns information regarding the persuasion process. Persuasion knowledge 
can be characterized as schemata regarding persuasion, including beliefs about psychological 
mediators in persuasion, marketers’ actions and their effects, and one’s efficacy in dealing 
with persuasion efforts. Persuasion knowledge operates during heuristic processing and 
systematic processing and under conditions of both low and high involvement. 
 Targets can access any or all of the three types of knowledge during a persuasion 
attempt, and the use of one type of knowledge will have an effect on the utility of the other 
types. An increase in the use of persuasion knowledge, for example, can result in a greater 
cognitive load and an attendant shift away from the use of topic knowledge. 
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Change of meaning 
A key contribution of the persuasion knowledge model is the “change-of-meaning” 
principle. A cue that is valid in the heuristic-systematic model could be perceived as a tactic. 
Once this occurs, the action changes meaning and the effectiveness is minimized or lost 
entirely. It does not matter whether the agent intended the action to be a tactic or not; what 
matters is that the target perceived the action as a tactic. Some tactics might be effective as 
long as they remain tacit. Once a target becomes aware of a tactic, though, the effect is no 
longer automatic and is eliminated. 
 One could assume the converse and have what this author would call the 
“reinforcement-of-meaning” principle. If a technique is perceived as a tactic, but one that is 
evaluated under persuasion knowledge as being appropriate or respectful, then the 
effectiveness of that tactic is heightened, not minimized. This approach assumes a 
nonadversarial model, of course. The difference between a change of meaning and a 
reinforcement of meaning is based on a qualitative difference between types of persuasion 
knowledge; it is not based on any expert/novice distinction that derives from the amount of 
persuasion knowledge a target possesses. 
 The notions of the “reinforcement-of-meaning” principle and the “change-of-
meaning” principle parallel the three hypotheses outlined in the heuristic-systematic model. 
The “reinforcement-of-meaning” principle resembles the additivity hypothesis in the sense 
that both predict that a tactic or cue that is congruent with the persuasion effort or systematic 
argument will yield an effect of a complementary nature. The “change-of-meaning” principle 
parallels both the attenuation hypothesis and the bias hypothesis. A tactic or cue that is 
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incongruent with the argument will reduce the effectiveness of the message or otherwise 
change its meaning in unintended ways.  
One key distinction between the HSM and PKM, however, is that additivity and 
attenuation are described primarily in terms of strength, with bias incorporating a change in 
valence. The change-of-meaning principle, however, focuses on a change in valence, but not 
strength. More precise predictions and explanations can be proffered by separating the 
related ideas of strength and valence.  
 
Persuasion knowledge and worldview 
Although both persuasion knowledge and worldview can be thought of as belief-
based sources of influence on information processing, they are not equivalent. Persuasion 
knowledge comes from both a target’s personal experience and reflection and from a shared 
cultural folk model of persuasion. Persuasion knowledge is learned over time, and because 
persuasion knowledge is learned over time, it is dynamic, continually evolving. Persuasion 
knowledge and worldviews are distinct constructs, though. Unlike persuasion knowledge, 
which is learned and more changeable, the core assumptions of a worldview are largely tacit 
and much less malleable. A person who holds relativist assumptions believes that science is 
value laden and that absolute objectivity is impossible. The assumption that truth is relative 
and contextual is not labile like persuasion schemata regarding, say, a salesperson. 
Persuasion knowledge, like other nonfoundational schemata, is influenced by or situated in 
one’s culture and worldview. 
Thus far, this chapter has examined worldview theory and its possible contribution to 
media effects research. This was followed by an overview of two dual-process models of 
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persuasion to which the construct of worldview might relate, namely the heuristic-systematic 
model and the persuasion knowledge model. One final element to be examined is terror 
management theory and its relationship to theories of worldview and persuasion. 
 
Terror Management Theory 
 
Worldviews can be assessed as a latent set of core beliefs that are internal, but 
situational cues can prime a latent worldview’s salience and bring it to bear on the way a 
person interprets events. Terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 
2003; Pyszczynski et al., 2004) holds that awareness of one’s own mortality triggers anxiety, 
which leads people to cope with it in two ways: by defending their cultural worldview and 
boosting their self-esteem. Fear is a strong motivating force, and to deal with their anxieties, 
people endeavor to maintain their existing self identity and understanding of the world 
(Pyszczynski & Cox, p. 428). These actions serve to buffer the effects of existential anxiety.  
A cultural worldview is socially constructed and dependent on social validation. 
Pyszczynski et al. (2004) define a cultural worldview as shared symbolic conceptions of 
reality that provide a sense of meaning and order to one’s existence. In addition, a cultural 
worldview offers a standard of values and a promise of literal or symbolic immortality. It is 
derived from culture but internalized in each individual, varying across cultures and persons.  
Mortality salience is a useful manipulation in experimental conditions. Researchers 
have found that making mortality salient leads people to defend their worldview and boost 
self-esteem (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). More than 150 studies have provided support for 
mortality salience in a variety of contexts (Arndt, Cook, & Routledge, 2004), including 
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persuasion, such as resistance to persuasive appeals (Shehryar & Hunt, 2005) and the 
relationship of death-related thoughts and personal relevance (Solomon, Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Pryzbylinski, 1995).  
A mortality salience induction can generate two types of responses. A proximal 
response occurs when participants consciously deal with their concerns immediately after the 
manipulation. This serves to reduce death-related anxiety. If participants are not able to 
engage in a proximal response, then after a short period of time they engage in distal 
nonconscious responses such as stereotyping that appear to the participant to be unrelated to 
an awareness of their mortality. 
Greenberg et al. (2003) defined and operationalized the worldview through national 
U.S. identity and measured an increase in pro-U.S. bias as defense of the cultural worldview. 
This assumes, of course, the pre-existence of a pro-U.S. bias, which mortality salience should 
intensify. They found that mortality salience resulted in an increase in U.S. nationalism. 
However, nationalism is only one element of a cultural worldview. It is likely that other types 
of thought patterns were intensified, as well. 
The defense motivation parallels the primary motivational mechanism in terror 
management theory (Greenberg et al., 2003) and suggests a link between the theories. Chen 
and Chaiken (1999) wrote, “The defense-motivated perceiver aims to preserve the self-
concept and associated world views, and thus processes information selectively—that is, in a 
way that best satisfies such defense concerns” (p. 77). Thus, a person’s defense of a cultural 
worldview leads to a reliance on heuristics that are closely tied to one’s sense of meaning. 
This explanation certainly is congruent with findings from terror management research, such 
as increased stereotyping when mortality is salient. Mortality salience, then, shifts one’s 
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primary motivation from accuracy to defense, which heightens the influence of one’s 
worldview, which in turn influences the accessibility and diagnosticity of available heuristics. 
Although mortality salience should lead to defensive processing in general, it is still 
uncertain what main effect, if any, mortality salience would have on an expertise cue, 
argument quality, or general evaluations of ads. It is also uncertain if mortality salience 
would interact with an expertise cue or with argument quality to affect evaluations of ads. 
Therefore, the following research questions are posed: 
 
RQ3: What effect, if any, will mortality salience have on evaluations of ads? 
 
RQ4: Will mortality salience interact with an expertise cue or with argument quality 
to affect the evaluation of ads? 
 
If mortality salience affects the influence of either argument quality or an expertise 
cue, it is uncertain in what way mortality salience might moderate the product of the 
additivity hypothesis. This three-way interaction of expertise cue, argument quality, and 
mortality salience leads to the following research question: 
 
RQ5: Will mortality salience moderate the joint effect of both an expertise cue and a 
strong argument?  
 
The defense motivation of the heuristic-systematic model predicts that an individual 
whose existing self-identity and beliefs are threatened will be motivated to engage in 
defensive processing. Terror management theory, in a similar fashion, predicts that making 
one’s mortality salient will lead an individual to defend one’s cultural worldview. This 
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dissertation predicts, therefore, that manipulating mortality salience will heighten the 
accessibility of one’s worldview.  
 
H4: Mortality salience will affect worldview such that the slope of the worldview 
scores will be greater in the mortality salience condition than in the alternate 
condition. 
 
If a relativist worldview interacts with an expertise cue to moderate the effect of the 
cue on the evaluation of ads, and if mortality salience intensifies the influence of a worldview, 
these effects should combine to intensify the two-way interaction predicted in H1. Likewise, 
if a relativist worldview interacts with a strong propositional argument to moderate the effect 
of argument quality, mortality salience should make the interaction predicted in H2 even 
stronger. 
 
H5: Mortality salience, worldview, and an expertise cue will interact such that 
participants’ evaluations of ads will be lower (higher) than the two-way 
interaction tested in H1.  
 
H6: Mortality salience, worldview, and argument quality will interact such that 
participants’ evaluations of ads will be lower (higher) than the two-way 





The hypotheses were tested in a post-test only 2 (Expertise cue, within participants) X 
2 (Argument quality, between participants) X 2 (Mortality salience, between participants) X 
a relativist worldview (a measured variable, between participants) mixed-factorial 
experiment (N = 156). The design is illustrated in Figure 2. 
After being assigned to either a mortality salience condition or a control condition, 
the degree to which participants’ worldview tended toward relativism was assessed. 
Participants then viewed ads that contained an argument quality manipulation and an 
expertise cue manipulation after which they reported their attitude toward the ad, attitude 
toward the brand, and behavioral intentions. 
 
Participants 
Participants were drawn from undergraduate students of journalism and mass 
communication at a major southeastern university and were offered course credit in exchange 
for their participation. 
 
Stimulus materials 
Mortality salience. Mortality salience was manipulated using the procedure followed by 
Greenberg et al. (2003). Participants were asked to write responses to the following two 
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questions: “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses 
in you” and “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you 
physically die and once you are physically dead.” In the Greenberg et al. control condition 
participants were asked about dental pain. Halloran and Kashima (2004), however, asked 
participants to complete similar questions about watching television as a control condition. 
Because this dissertation concerns epistemological assumptions and not pain, it employed the 
Halloran and Kashima control condition of watching television.  
 
Need for closure. Because the effects of the mortality salience manipulation are strongest 
following a short delay, a filler task was used before measuring the effects of the 
manipulation. Halloran and Kashima (2004) used the Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) as a filler task after the manipulation. Ferraro, Shiv, and 
Bettman (2005) also administered the mood instrument following a mortality salience 
manipulation, but they also used the measure to control for mood effects. In the present 
dissertation, the Need for Closure (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993) was administered as 
a filler task following the mortality salience manipulation (see Appendix C). This instrument 
was used also to measure trait involvement for possible inclusion as a covariate. A high need 
for closure is associated with a greater proportion of heuristic thoughts to systematic thoughts 
because people who rank high in the need for cognitive closure tend to use mental shortcuts 
to reach a quick decision (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem). Similarly, a high need for closure 
is associated with a greater reliance on implicit theories (or worldview) in making inferences 
(Chiu et al., 2000). 
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Worldview. To reduce mono-operation bias, two instruments were used to measure a 
participant’s worldview. A relativist worldview was assessed via the Constructivist 
Assumptions Scale (Berzonsky, 1994) and the Attitudes About Reality Scale (Unger et al., 
1986). 
The Constructivist Assumptions Scale (Appendix C) is a 12-item instrument designed 
to evaluate the extent to which a person agrees with constructivist assumptions on the 
possibility of objective and permanent knowledge. Although the measure was developed in 
the context of ascertaining a person’s identity style or conception of the self, it is equally 
useful in probing a person’s attitudes toward the nature of reality in general. Statements 
include: “What we see with our own eyes is influenced by our expectations,” “Scientific facts 
are universal truths; they do not change over time” (reversed), and “Truth is relative. What is 
true at one point in time may not be true at another.” The scale has a reported Cronbach’s 
alpha of .80. 
The Attitudes About Reality Scale (Appendix C) was developed to measure personal 
epistemology regarding science and knowledge and assesses the degree to which a person 
believes that reality is objectively knowable or socially constructed. Although there is some 
debate about the measure’s construct validity, namely whether one end of the scale should be 
called logical positivism (Jackson & Jeffers, 1989; Harrison & Atherton, 1992), researchers 
tend to agree that the other end represents a relativist perspective. The 40-item scale had a 
reported alpha of .72, and the revised 28-item measure had an alpha of .80. The AAR has 
been used in several studies and has been reported to be associated with education, political 
attitudes and religious affiliation (Unger et al., 1986; Columbus, 1993; Evans, 2000).  
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Argument quality. A series of strong and weak arguments was developed for 10 ads for 
consumer goods, durable goods, and a political candidate and a political issue. These 
arguments, as well as the arguments from two ads used in separate published studies that 
manipulated argument quality (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983; and Sengupta, 
Goodstein, & Boninger, 1997), were administered in a pretest (N = 37) to determine which of 
the 144 statements ranked highest and lowest. On a 9-point Likert-type scale the mean 
evaluations ranged from 2.27 to 7.42. The results of the pretest revealed that the arguments 
used in published studies ranked as high and as low as the other arguments generated for the 
pretest. In the interest of comparability with previous studies, therefore, it was decided to 
employ the published ads and adapt them for the present experiment with the substitution of 
expertise cues for the celebrity endorser cues used in those studies. 
In the dissertation experiment participants were asked to rate a battery of two 
counterbalanced print ads. The first ad was for “Ritual” mouthwash (Sengupta et al., 1997). 
The strong arguments were “Ritual far outperforms all other brands at reducing bad breath;” 
Ritual kills harmful germs, according to laboratory tests;” and “Leaves your mouth with a 
fresh, great-tasting, minty flavor.” The weak arguments were “Ritual has a stylish easy-to-
use cap that matches the bottle;” Ritual is available in an attractive, fresh new color, too;” 
and “Ritual comes in many convenient sizes, including a handy trial size.” The brand name 
appeared in the upper right-hand portion of the page. The arguments were placed across the 
upper center portion of the page. A stock photograph of a young woman pouring mouthwash 
was placed prominently in the lower left-hand portion of the page. The ad also featured a 
light pink background, a color that complemented the photograph. In the lower right-hand 
margin of the page appeared the statement “Start your day with Ritual.”  
40
A second ad was for a razor (Petty et al., 1983; Kahle & Homer, 1985). The razor in 
the original study (Petty et al.) was branded “Edge,” which might prime associations with 
“Edge” shaving cream, a popular product, among some participants. The brand was changed, 
therefore, from “Edge” to “Quest” to minimize potential confounds. The brand name 
appeared in the upper center portion of the page, with a stock photo of a razor in the upper 
right-hand corner. Below the brand name and photo appeared the statement “Until you try the 
new Quest disposable razor, you’ll never know what a ‘really close shave’ is.” A stock photo 
of a razor in water with a blue background filled in the lower left-hand quarter of the page. 
At the bottom center of the page appeared the statement “Get the Quest difference!” The 
arguments appeared in the lower right-hand quarter of the page. The original study (Petty et 
al.) featured five strong statements and five weak statements, but only three statements of 
each type were used in this dissertation so that the manipulation of argument quality would 
be comparable with that of the mouthwash ad. The strong arguments were “Special 
chemically formulated coating eliminates nicks and cuts and prevents rusting;” In direct 
comparison tests, the Quest blade gave twice as many close shaves as its nearest competitor;” 
and “Unique angle placement of the blade provides the smoothest shave possible.” The weak 
arguments were “Floats in water with only a minimum of rust, spotting, or corrosion;” “In 
direct comparison tests, the Quest blade gave no more nicks and cuts than its competition;” 
and “The Quest razor comes in various sizes, shapes, and colors, with a matching case.”  
Some of the statements for strong and weak arguments were edited slightly so that all 
the statements would be approximately the same length and would avoid cueing the “length-
is-strength” heuristic (Wood, Kallgren, & Preisler, 1985).  
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Expertise cue. In the ad for mouthwash, expertise was manipulated by placing in the upper 
right-hand corner a stock photograph of a female chemist wearing a white lab coat and 
protective goggles studying a test-tube of liquid. The phrase “Developed by Ritual 
Laboratories” was superimposed over the lower portion of the photograph. In the ad for 
razors, expertise was manipulated by placing in the upper right-hand corner a stock 
photograph of a male engineer wearing a white lab coat and protective goggles measuring 
small rectangular metal plates with calipers. The phrase “Developed by Quest Laboratories” 
was superimposed over the lower portion of the photograph. In those ads in which the cue 
did not appear, the space was empty. 
A mock legal notice in fine print (6-point font) was placed at the bottom of each ad. 
The notice at the bottom of the mouthwash ad read: “© 2005 Ritual. Patent Pending. All 
rights reserved.” The notice at the bottom of the razor ad was similar: “© 2005 Quest. Patent 
Pending. All rights reserved.” Each ad was designed to resemble a publisher’s proof with 
crop marks of a full-page ad in a magazine. For each ad, four versions were created, each of 
which featured either a strong or weak argument and the presence or absence of an expertise 
cue (Appendix C). Participants viewed only one version of each ad, depending on the 
experimental condition and counterbalancing sequence to which they were assigned. The 
order of the ads, argument quality, and expertise cues was counterbalanced via Latin squares. 
The counterbalanced order is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Dependent Variables. The effectiveness of the ads was assessed by asking participants to 
report their attitude toward the ad, attitude toward the brand, and behavioral intentions. 
Attitude toward the ad and attitude toward the brand were measured using 9-point semantic 
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differential scales using prompts from the Attitude Toward the Business (Overall) scale 
(Bruner, James, & Hensel, 1992; Kalyanaraman & Oliver, 2001). Examples include: 
“Appealing-Unappealing;” “Clear-Confusing;” “Interesting-Boring;” and “Positive-
Negative” (see Appendix C). Behavioral intentions were measured on a 9-point Likert-type 
scale using prompts from the Behavioral Intention scale (Bruner et al., 1992). The two items 
were the following: “Rate the probability that you would purchase this product;” and “Rate 
the probability that you would try a free sample of this product” (see Appendix C).  
 
Procedure 
The dissertation involved 156 undergraduate students, who participated in exchange 
for course credit as part of the participant pool in the School of Journalism and Mass 
Communication. Of the total, 74% were female, and 78% were Caucasian, which reflected 
the composition of the population of undergraduate journalism students at the university. 
The study took place in a large classroom in the School of Journalism and Mass 
Communication. The majority of the sessions took place in the afternoon or early evening. 
The number of participants in an experimental session ranged from 6 to 15. After a brief 
introduction and explanation, each participant completed the study independently. 
Participants in a single session were randomly assigned to different experimental conditions. 
When larger numbers of participants were present, it was nearly possible to conduct all 16 
conditions simultaneously, which avoided the possibility that a particular session might be 
confounded with experimental condition. 
People who are highly motivated and able to form an attitude toward a particular 
target are more likely to exert greater effort and process information systematically (Chaiken 
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et al., 1989). Therefore, to promote a condition of low-involvement processing, participants 
were told that they were participating in a series of studies that measure a variety of topics, 
including philosophies of life and attitudes toward many things in general, such as media use 
and advertising. They were told that their responses would be used to refine experimental 
materials that would be used in future studies. To minimize the possibility of missing data, 
however, participants were encouraged to complete each questionnaire completely before 
proceeding to the next one. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a mortality salience condition or a television 
(control) condition. After the mortality salience manipulation, participants completed the 
Need For Closure (Kruglanski et al., 1993), followed by the Constructivist Assumptions 
Scale (Berzonsky, 1994) and the Attitudes About Reality Scale (Unger et al., 1986). 
Participants then viewed and evaluated a counterbalanced battery of 2 ads. Participants 
evaluated the first ad before proceeding to the second one. For example, Participant 1, after 
giving an informed consent and assigned to the mortality salience condition, began by 
answering the mortality salience prompts: “Please briefly describe the emotions that the 
thought of your own death arouses in you;” and “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what 
you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead.” This 
participant then completed the Need for Closure Scale, followed by the Constructivist 
Assumptions Scale and the Attitudes About Reality Scale. Then, Participant 1 viewed the 
first ad, which contains a strong argument and an expertise cue. After viewing that ad, the 
participant rated the ad for attitude toward the ad, attitude toward the brand, and behavioral 
intentions. That person then completed the manipulation check measures (argument quality, 
perceived expertise, and perceived credibility). Participant 1 then viewed a second ad, which 
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contain a second strong argument and no expertise cue, and rated the ad on the same 
dependent measures in the same order.  
Participant 2, assigned to the control (TV) condition, was asked to complete the 
following prompts: “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of watching 
television arouses in you;” and “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think happens 
to you as you watch television.” Then, Participant 2 completed the Need for Closure Scale, 
followed by the Constructivist Assumptions Scale and the Attitudes About Reality Scale. 
Participant 2 then viewed and evaluated a sequence of counterbalanced ads, the first of which 
contained a strong argument and an expertise cue. After viewing this ad, the participant rated 
the ad for attitude toward the ad, attitude toward the brand, and behavioral intentions, 
followed by the manipulation checks. Participant 2 proceeded to a second ad, which 
contained a strong argument and no expertise cue, and evaluated the ad. The sequence for the 
subsequent two participants mirrored that of the first two participants, except that the ads 
contained weak arguments instead of strong arguments. Thus, Participant 3, like Participant 1, 
was assigned to the mortality salience condition, with the only difference being that the ads 
that Participant 3 viewed contained a weak argument. Likewise, the sequence for Participant 
4 followed that of Participant 2, with the difference that the ads featured a weak argument.  
At the end of the session, to counter effects of the mortality salience condition, all 
participants were asked to complete the following prompts: “Please briefly describe the 
emotions that finding a winning lottery ticket for $1 million would arouse in you;” and “Jot 
down, as specifically as you can, what you think you would do if you won $1 million.” 
Following the conclusion of the experiment, participants were debriefed and thanked.  
 




The data were screened for outliers, and four cases with a large Cook’s distance on at 
least two of the three dependent variables were deleted. Two cases that exhibited response 
sets were deleted, and the responses of one student who dozed off during the experimental 
session were excluded, as well. The remaining 149 cases were analyzed. 
The variables were screened for univariate normality (Table 2). On a nine-point 
Likert-type scale, the expected standard deviation is 1.33 (8 points divided by 6 standard 
deviations), and the Need For Closure Scale, the Constructivist Assumptions Scale, and the 
Attitude About Reality scale yielded a standard statistic that was less than .85, suggesting 
that the distribution of scores was somewhat restricted. For most variables, skewness and 
kurtosis were within acceptable limits, with none of the coefficients exceeding 2.0. However, 
the scores on the Need For Closure Scale and the Constructivist Assumptions Scale tended to 
be leptokurtic, as their coefficients exceeded twice their standard error. Nevertheless, neither 
of the variables was transformed, as neither exhibited severe kurtosis.  
 
Scale assessment 
 The unidimensionality of the measures was assessed via the method recommended by 
(Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). Each measure should assess only one construct, as tested by a 
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confirmatory factor analysis. If a scale is unidimensional, the 2 value should be non-
significant. If the 2 value is significant, however, the Cronbach’s alpha reliability estimate 
should be interpreted with caution, as the scale might assess more than a single unitary 
construct. None of the measures was unidimensional (Table 3), but no change was made to 
improve their unidimensionality because the measures were drawn from published research 
and refinements might jeopardize the comparability of the results with other research. 
The reliability of the continuous variables was assessed via Cronbach’s  (Table 3). 
The Constructivist Assumptions Scale yielded a Cronbach’s  of .59, which was too low for 
the measure to be used profitably, so the scale was excluded from the analysis. The Attitudes 
About Reality scale yielded a Cronbach’s  of .77, which though lower than desired, did not 
preclude its use. The correlation of the two items that made up the behavioral intentions 
measure (r = .50, p < .001) was strong. The measures of Aad and Abrand yielded a Cronbach’s 
 of .90 and .94, respectively. The measure for the 5-item manipulation check of perceived 
argument quality yielded a Cronbach’s  of .86 for weak arguments and .82 for strong 
arguments. Because of an item-total correlation that was notably lower than its peers, one 
item each was removed from the measures of perceived expertise and perceived credibility, 
and each measure, which comprised three and five items, respectively, yielded a Cronbach’s 
 of .91.
Correlations of the independent and dependent variables used in this dissertation are 
found in Table 4. 
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Order and manipulation checks 
Because expertise cue was a within-subjects factor, the possibility of differential 
carryover was examined. To test for order effects, the means of the dependent measures (Aad,
Abrand, and behavioral intentions) in the first and second order were compared via paired t-
tests. Of the 48 pairs of dependent variables assessed (16 sequences x 3 dependent variables), 
differences between 13 pairs of means were statistically significant (p < .05). Therefore, the 
within-subjects factor of expertise cue was shifted to a between-subjects factor by using only 
the data from the first order.  
The manipulation checks for argument quality and expertise cue were assessed via a 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Argument quality was a significant predictor of the 
manipulation check measure, perceived argument quality, F(1, 147) = 11.631, p < .01. The 
expertise cue manipulation also appeared to be predictor of the manipulation check measure 
of perceived expertise, F(1, 147) = 3.787, p = .056. However, controlling for participants’ 
worldview by adding the Attitudes About Reality scale as a covariate strengthened the 
relationship with perceived expertise, F(2, 145) = 3.310, p = .039. This result indicates that 
participants perceived the expertise cue to be an indicator of expertise, unless the participants 
had a relativist worldview. Indeed, in a follow-up regression the sign for the expertise cue 
was positive, while the sign for the Attitudes About Reality scale was negative. The expertise 
cue manipulation did not predict the measure of perceived credibility F(1, 147) = < 1, p
= .838, but adding the Attitudes About Reality scale as a covariate produced a dramatic 
change, F(2, 145) = 5.318, p = .006.  
48
The three dependent variables were regressed separately on the Need for Closure 
scale, but the scale was not a statistically significant predictor. Therefore, the scale was not 
used as a covariate in the tests of hypotheses. 
 
Slope analysis 
 Three of the independent variables in this dissertation experiment were dichotomous, 
but worldview was a measured independent variable. Although it is common to dichotomize 
a continuous variable via a median split and follow analysis of variance procedures, the 
practice increases the standard error, making it more difficult to detect an interaction (Cohen, 
1990; Irwin & McClelland, 2003). Multiple regression is a more effective method of 
assessing interactions when a continuous variable is involved because the continuous 
variable is retained in its original form (Aiken & West, 1991; Irwin & McClelland, 2001). 
Continuous variables are centered with a mean of 0, and factors can be entered using dummy 
codes or effect codes. Because effect coding does not introduce correlations, as does dummy 
coding, effect coding is the appropriate method of coding for assessing interaction effects 
(Aiken & West, 1991). Further, under effect coding each variable is compared to the grand 
mean, and not to any particular reference group, as with dummy coding. Thus, effect coding 
is useful for assessing the average effect of variables and their interactions. When one wishes 
to compare groups to one another, dummy coding is the preferred coding system.  
By reversing the coding of a dummy-coded variable, one may focus the test on 
another variable of interest (Aiken & West, 1991; Irwin & McClelland, 2001). The slope of a 
variable is the coefficient of that variable when all the other variables are at 0. For example, 
the slope of worldview is the slope when mortality salience is equal to 0, that is, in the 
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control condition (i.e., when mortality salience is absent). By reversing the dummy codes in a 
second equation so that 0 = present instead of absent, the simple slope of worldview is the 
slope in the mortality salience condition (i.e., when mortality salience is present). The 
difference in the slopes of worldview in each of those two equations can be attributed, then, 
to the manipulation of mortality salience. 
The tests of hypotheses, therefore, were conducted using effect coding, and post-hoc 
comparisons of experimental conditions were conducted using dummy coding. All four 
independent variables (mortality salience, worldview, argument quality, and expertise cue) 
and their interaction terms were entered into a simultaneous ordinary least squares regression 
equation. Worldview was centered with a mean of 0. One equation was calculated for each of 
the three dependent variables with an adjustment for the family-wise error rate. Comparisons 
of the regression results of effect coding and dummy coding are presented in Tables 5-7. 
Comparisons of the regression results of reverse coded variables, which are used in post-hoc 
probes, are presented in Tables 8-13. The regression results with standard errors and 
standardized coefficients are presented in Tables 14-16. In the results that follow, it should be 
stressed that post-hoc analyses of nonsignificant results, while informative, are necessarily 
tentative.  
 
Tests of hypotheses 
Before proceeding to the tests of the dissertation’s hypotheses, the main effect of the 
argument quality and expertise cue manipulations was assessed. 
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Argument quality main effect 
 Tests of the main effect of argument quality revealed that the factor was a significant 
predictor of Abrand, t(132) = 2.382, p < .05, and behavioral intentions, t(132) = 2.769, p < .01,
but not of Aad. In each case the sign was positive. 
Aad = b0 + b1 x argument quality 
 
Aad = 4.508 + .109 A 
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x argument quality 
 
Abrand = 4.490 + .277 A*
BI  =  b0 + b1 x argument quality 
 
BI  =  4.514 + .404 A** 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
Argument quality had a significant main effect on two of the three dependent 
variables. This pattern was evident also in subsequent tests of interactions involving 
argument quality. 
 
Expertise cue main effect 
 Each of the tests of expertise cue in its effect on the dependent variables was 
nonsignificant. It should be noted that the sign was negative in each equation. 
Aad = b0 + b1 x expertise cue 
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.083 C 
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x expertise cue 
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.100 C 
 
BI  =  b0 + b1 x expertise cue 
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BI  =  4.514 + -.154 C 
 
Although a check of the manipulation of the expertise cue approached the 
significance level of p = .05 and suggested that the cue was a positive predictor of perceived 
expertise, the expertise cue did not significantly influence the dependent variables and had a 
negative sign in each case. This pattern of results suggested that although the expertise cue 
resulted in greater perceptions of expertise, at least among participants who tended not to 
have a relativist worldview, the expertise cue did not have a significant overall influence on 
Aad, Abrand, or behavioral intentions. 
 
RQ1: Main effect of worldview  
 Worldview was a significant negative predictor for Aad, t(132) = -2.558, p < .05, and 
behavioral intentions, t(132) = -3.652, p < .01, but not for Abrand.
Aad = b0 + b1 x worldview 
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.458 W*
Abrand = b0 + b1 x worldview 
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.150 W 
 
BI  =  b0 + b1 x worldview 
 
BI  =  4.514 + -.985 W** 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
Thus, some evidence was found for the possibility that worldview might have a main 
effect on evaluations of the ads. The more relativist one’s worldview was, the lower the 
evaluation of the ad and the likelihood that one would purchase or try the product. Figure 3 
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illustrates the main effect of worldview on each of the dependent variables, with the steepest 
negative slope for behavioral intentions and a nearly flat slope for Abrand.
It appeared that the main effects of worldview and argument quality focused on 
different targets, as worldview affected Aad, but not Abrand, and argument quality predicted 
Abrand, but not Aad. Both dependent variables were assessed via semantic differential scales, 
with Aad having 18 items and Abrand having 13 items, so method-related variance between 
them should be expected to be minimal. Therefore, the independent variables were tested in a 
single equation with Aad and Abrand as repeated-measures dependent variables. Neither the 
repeated measure factor F(1, 41) = .022 (p = .822), worldview F(80, 41) = 1.256 (p = .214), 
argument quality F(1, 41) = .037 (p = .848), nor their interaction F(23, 41) = 1.104 (p = .381)
was significant. Thus, neither worldview nor argument quality was a significant predictor of 
both Aad and Abrand.
H1: Worldview as a moderator of expertise cue  
 The tests of the interaction of worldview and expertise cue (W x C) were 
nonsignificant. Thus H1, was not supported. It appeared that worldview did not moderate the 
effect of the expertise cue. 
 Aad = b0 + b1 x worldview + b2 x expertise cue + b3 x worldview x expertise 
cue  
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.458 W* + -.083 C + -.154 W x C  
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x worldview + b2 x expertise cue + b3 x worldview x expertise 
cue  
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.150 W + -.100 C + .002 W x C 
 




BI  =  4.514 + -.985 W** + -.154 C + -.360 W x C 
 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
A post-hoc probe of the interaction for Aad and Abrand also indicated that, all else 
being zero, worldview and an expertise cue interacted little, if at all. For behavioral 
intentions, however, the magnitude of the slope changed moderately. The simple slope of 
expertise cue -.614 (n.s.), declined by an additional -1.535 (n.s.) (Table 9) when the influence 
of a relativist worldview was added. That is, the expertise cue was associated with a lower 
likelihood of behavioral intentions, but this effect was much lower among participants who 
tended toward a relativist worldview. The nature of the interaction for each of the dependent 
variables in the control condition is depicted in Figures 4a, 5a, and 6a. The differences in the 
slopes when a cue is present or absent are larger for behavioral intentions and more modest 
for Aad.
H2: Worldview as a moderator of argument quality  
 The tests of the interaction of worldview and argument quality (W x A) were 
nonsignificant. Thus H2, was not supported. It appeared that worldview did not moderate the 
influence of argument quality with regard to the dependent variables. 
 Aad = b0 + b1 x worldview + b2 x argument quality + b3 x worldview x 
argument quality  
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.458 W* +.109 A + -.143 W x A  
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x worldview + b2 x argument quality + b3 x worldview x 
argument quality  
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.150 W +.386 A* + .067 W x A
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 BI  =  b0 + b1 x worldview + b2 x argument quality + b3 x worldview x 
argument quality  
 
BI  =  4.514 + -.985 W** +.404 A** + -.284 W x A 
 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
A post-hoc probe revealed a negligible difference in the slope of argument quality for 
Aad and a modestly larger change in slope in predicting Abrand, but a quite larger change in 
predicting behavioral intentions. For Aad, in which argument quality was not a significant 
predictor, the simple slope of worldview for Aad changed little, from .136 (n.s.) when 
arguments were weak to .148 (n.s.) when arguments were strong (Table 7). For Abrand, in 
which argument quality, but not worldview, was a significant predictor, the simple slope of 
worldview changed from -.065 (n.s.) to .164 (n.s.), the difference being the slope of the (W x 
A) interaction coefficient, .228 (Table 8). For behavioral intentions, in which both worldview 
and argument quality were significant predictors, the slope of worldview changed from .775 
(n.s.) to .019 (n.s.) (Table 9). This relationship can be viewed from the opposite perspective, 
which might be intuitively more explanatory. The slope for argument quality was .461 (n.s.) 
(Table 9), and the magnitude of the interaction term (W x A) was -.756 (n.s.), meaning that 
the slope changed from .461 to -.295 with the addition of a relativist worldview.  
 In general, strong arguments seemed to make an accessible worldview be more 
diagnostic in evaluating the ads. Thus, worldview appeared to moderate argument quality 
when both variables had a significant main effect. Figure 9a illustrates the clear change in 
slopes for strong and weak arguments in predicting behavioral intentions. The more relativist 
one’s worldview was, the less persuasive the strong arguments were for getting that person to 
try the product. For Aad, argument quality was not strong enough for its influence to be 
noticeably moderated by worldview. A modest change in slope is evident in Figure7a. For 
55
Abrand, the influence of worldview was not strong enough to moderate argument quality, 
which is represented by the two flat lines in Figure 8a. 
 
H3: Additivity, attenuation, and bias 
 The heuristic-systematic model predicts that when argument quality and expertise are 
congruent the effect of expertise cue is additive, meaning the cue should contribute to even 
more favorable evaluations than the quality of the argument alone. When the heuristic cue is 
incongruent with the systematic information, then the effect should be one of attenuation, 
wherein the argument reduces the effect of the cue. Tests of the interaction between 
argument quality and expertise cue (A x C) were nonsignificant, but post-hoc probes 
suggested that the expertise cue might have been ambiguous and that its valence was 
determined by the valence of the arguments with which the cue was paired.  
 Aad = b0 + b1 x expertise cue + b2 x argument quality + b3 x
expertise cue x argument quality 
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.083 C + .109 A + -.020 C x A 
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x expertise cue + b2 x argument quality + b3 x expertise cue x 
argument quality 
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.100 C + .277 A* + .096 C x A
BI  =  b0 + b1 x expertise cue + b2 x argument quality + b3 x expertise cue x 
argument quality 
 
BI  =  4.514 + -.154 C + .404 A** + -.115 C x A 
 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
It should be noted, again, that the sign of the slope of argument quality was positive, 
while in each test of the main effect of expertise cue the sign was negative, which suggests 
that the presence of the cue may not necessarily have led to a more favorable evaluation of 
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the ad. Thus, the joint effect of argument quality and the expertise cue, contrary to the 
prediction, should not be additive.  
A post-hoc probe revealed that when arguments were strong, the presence of an 
expertise cue attenuated Aad by -.134 (n.s.) (Table 7), but when arguments were weak, the 
presence of the cue attenuated Aad even further, -.433 (n.s.). However, the relationship was 
clearer for Abrand and behavioral intentions, in which argument quality had a significant main 
effect. For Abrand, the slope for expertise cue was .285 (n.s.) (Table 8) when arguments were 
strong, but when arguments were weak, the slope fell to -.355 (n.s.), the difference being the 
coefficient for their interaction, -.640 (n.s.). A similar pattern emerged for behavioral 
intentions. When arguments were strong, the slope for expertise cue was .429 (n.s.) (Table 9), 
but when arguments were weak the slope was -.614 (n.s.). Graphs of the interaction in the 
control condition for each dependent variable are found in Figures 10a, 11a, and 12a. In 
Figure 10a, the minor difference between strong and weak arguments in predicting Aad 
becomes more pronounced with the presence of an expertise cue. In Figures 11a and 12a, 
strong arguments clearly become stronger with the addition of an expertise cue, and weak 
arguments become markedly weaker when the cue is present. 
To focus on the interaction from the opposite direction, one can examine the effect of 
the presence or absence of an expertise cue on strong arguments. For strong arguments, the 
presence of an expertise cue increased the slope of argument quality from -.042 (n.s.) to .253 
(n.s.) in predicting Aad (Table 7). For Abrand, in which argument quality was a significant 
predictor, the expertise cue increased the slope of argument quality from .121 (n.s.) to .761 
(n.s.) (Table 8). For behavioral intentions, the cue boosted the slope from .461 (n.s.) to 1.504 
(p < .05) (Table 9). 
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In sum, the effect of the expertise cue was additive for strong arguments but 
attenuating for weak arguments. This pattern of results suggests that the valence of the 
arguments biased the influence of the expertise cue. The interaction term is nonsignificant, of 
course, but the results seem to suggest that systematic processing can bias heuristic 
processing. 
 
RQ2: Worldview as a moderator of the interaction of argument quality and expertise cue 
 A possible effect of worldview on the interaction of argument quality and expertise 
cue (W x A x C) was not statistically significant. 
 Aad = b0 + b1 x worldview + b2 x argument quality + b3 x expertise cue 
 + b4 x worldview x argument quality + b5 x worldview x 
 expertise cue + b6 x argument quality x expertise cue + b7 x worldview 
 x argument quality x expertise cue 
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.002 W + .109 A + -.083 C + -.143 W x A + -.154 W x C  
 + -.020 A x C + .016 W x A x C  
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x worldview + b2 x argument quality + b3 x expertise cue 
 + b4 x worldview x argument quality + b5 x worldview x 
 expertise cue + b6 x argument quality x expertise cue + b7 x worldview 
 x argument quality x expertise cue 
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.023 W + .277 A* + -.100 C + .067 W x A + .002 W x C 
 + .096 A x C + -.111 W x A x C 
 
BI  =  b0 + b1 x worldview + b2 x argument quality + b3 x expertise cue 
 + b4 x worldview x argument quality + b5 x worldview x 
 expertise cue + b6 x argument quality x expertise cue + b7 x worldview 
 x argument quality x expertise cue 
 
BI  =  4.514 + .091 W + .404 A** + -.154 C + -.284 W x A + -.360 W x C 
 + -.115 A x C + -.171 W x A x C 
 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
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 Post-hoc probes revealed that worldview became more diagnostic when the ads 
featured both a strong argument and an expertise cue than when the ads employed only one 
manipulation or neither. The simple simple slope of worldview was -.658 (n.s.) for Aad, a
marked difference from evaluations of ads containing an expertise cue alone, .061 (n.s.), or a 
strong argument alone, .148 (n.s.). The magnitude and direction suggest that the influence of 
a relativist worldview was stronger when the ads featured both a strong argument and an 
expertise cue. The interaction is illustrated in Figure 13. For Abrand, a similar, though less 
marked, effect was apparent, with the slope of worldview changing to -.342 (n.s.) from -.054 
(n.s.) for an expertise cue alone or from .164 (n.s.) for strong arguments alone (Fig. 14). The 
most dramatic shift was detected for behavioral intentions (Fig. 15). The simple simple slope 
of worldview changed from .019 (n.s.) for ads containing a strong argument alone and from -
.759 (n.s.) for ads featuring an expertise cue alone to -1.335 (p = .052) when both features 
were present. 
 
RQ3: Main effect of mortality salience 
 Tests of the main effect of mortality salience were nonsignificant. Mortality salience 
was not expected to have a direct effect on the dependent variables, but rather as a moderator 
of other independent variables. Nevertheless, the possibility of a direct effect was assessed 
before proceeding with the subsequent tests. 
Aad = b0 + b1 x mortality salience 
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.002 M 
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x mortality salience 
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.023 M 
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BI  =  b0 + b1 x mortality salience 
 
BI  =  4.514 + .091 M 
 
RQ4a: Mortality salience as a moderator of expertise cue  
Tests of a possible 2-way interaction of mortality salience and an expertise cue (M x C) 
were nonsignificant. It appeared that making mortality salient did not appreciably moderate 
the influence of an expertise cue. 
 Aad = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x expertise cue + b3 x mortality salience 
x expertise cue  
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.002 M + -.083 C + .060 M x C  
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x expertise cue + b3 x mortality salience 
x expertise cue  
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.023 M + -.100 C + -.082 M x C 
 
BI  =  b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x expertise cue + b3 x mortality salience 
x expertise cue  
 
BI  =  4.514 + .091 M + -.154 C + -.108 M x C 
 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
Post-hoc probes of the relationship suggested, however, that mortality salience may 
have influenced the effect of the expertise cue, changing the valence from a negative 
direction to a positive direction for Aad and behavioral intentions, both equations, incidentally, 
in which worldview had a significant main effect. For Aad, the valence of the cue was 
reversed, as the simple slope changed from -.432 (n.s.) (Table 7) in the control condition 
to .180 (n.s.) in the mortality salience condition, a difference of .613 (n.s.). For behavioral 
intentions, likewise, the slope for the cue changed from -.614 (n.s.) (Table 9) to .458 (n.s.), a 
difference of 1.072 (n.s.). For Abrand, however, the change in slope was quite modest, from -
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.355 (n.s.) to -.427 (n.s.) (Table 8). The nonsignificant interaction of mortality salience and 
expertise cue, given a weak argument (A = 0) it their influence on Aad is illustrated in Figure 
16. The parallel lines in Figure 17 demonstrate the lack of an interaction in predicting Abrand,
while Figure 18 illustrates their relationship in predicting behavioral intentions.  
The accessibility of worldview may have mediated the influence of mortality salience 
on the expertise cues, as the larger and positive changes occurred only in the equations in 
which worldview had a significant main effect. This possibility was be explored in H5.  
 
RQ4b: Mortality salience as a moderator of argument quality  
Tests of a possible 2-way interaction of mortality salience and argument quality (M x 
A), likewise, were nonsignificant. It appeared that making mortality salient did not 
appreciably moderate the influence of the arguments employed. 
 Aad = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x argument quality + b3 x mortality 
salience x argument quality  
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.002 M +.109 A + .057 M x A  
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x argument quality + b3 x mortality 
salience x argument quality  
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.023 M +.386 A* + .056 M x A
BI  =  b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x argument quality + b3 x mortality 
salience x argument quality  
 
BI  =  4.514 + .091 M +.404 A** + -.087 M x A 
 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
Post-hoc probes of the relationship suggested, however, that making mortality salient 
may have resulted in an increase in systematic processing. For Aad, the simple slope of 
argument quality changed from -.042 (n.s.) in the control condition to .559 (n.s.). For Abrand,
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the slope changed from .121 (n.s.) to .603 (n.s.), while for behavioral intentions, the change 
in the simple slope was more dramatic, shifting from .461 (n.s.) to 1.614 (p < .01) in the 
mortality salience condition.  
It seems that participants scrutinized the arguments more carefully when the 
participants’ mortality was made salient. Figures 19, 20, and 21 illustrate the relationship 
between mortality salience and argument quality when no expertise cue is present. This 
pattern of results also mirrors the effect of high involvement on processing. Although this 
pattern will be discussed in Chapter 4, it bears noting at this point that this pattern of 
nonsignificant results is inconsistent with studies that found that mortality salience induction 
results in increased heuristic-type processing but not increased systematic-type processing. 
 
RQ5: Mortality salience as a moderator of the interaction of argument quality and expertise 
cue 
 The possible influence of mortality salience as a moderator of the argument quality-
expertise cue relationship (M x A x C) was tested. The interaction was a significant predictor 
of behavioral intentions (t = -2.578, p < .05), suggesting that mortality salience may have 
moderated the interaction of argument quality and expertise cue. Thus, partial support for 
RQ5 was found.  
 Aad = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x argument quality + b3 x expertise cue 
 + b4 x mortality salience x argument quality + b5 x mortality salience x 
 expertise cue + b6 x argument quality x expertise cue+ b7 x mortality  
 salience x argument quality x expertise cue 
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.002 M + .109 A + -.083 C +.057 M x A + .060 M x C  
 + -.020 A x C + -.093 M x A x C  
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x argument quality + b3 x expertise cue 
 + b4 x mortality salience x argument quality + b5 x mortality salience x 
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 expertise cue + b6 x argument quality x expertise cue+ b7 x mortality  
 salience x argument quality x expertise cue 
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.023 M + .277 A* + -.100 C + .056 M x A + -.082 M x C 
 + .096 A x C + -.064 M x A x C 
 
BI  =  b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x argument quality + b3 x expertise cue 
 + b4 x mortality salience x argument quality + b5 x mortality salience x 
 expertise cue + b6 x argument quality x expertise cue+ b7 x mortality  
 salience x argument quality x expertise cue 
 
BI  =  4.514 + .091 M + .404 A** + -.154 C + -.087 M x A + -.108 M x C 
 + -.115 A x C + -.376 M x A x C*
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
In the earlier section on additivity and attenuation, it was noted that argument quality 
appeared to have biased the valence of the expertise cue such that the cue made strong 
arguments stronger and weak arguments weaker, as depicted in Figures 10a, 11a, and 12a. 
This phenomenon disappeared, however, when mortality was made salient (Figs. 10b, 11b, 
and 12b). For strong arguments, the slope of the expertise cue was .285 (n.s.) in predicting 
Abrand, but the cue was additive for strong arguments only when mortality was not salient. 
When mortality was salient, the slope of the expertise cue declined to -.302 (n.s.). A similar 
effect was found for behavioral intentions. When arguments were strong, the slope of the 
expertise cue was .429 (n.s.), but the slope of expertise cue changed to -1.506 (p < .05) when 
mortality was salient. The same phenomenon was detected to a lesser degree for Aad, in 
which argument quality did not have a significant main effect. The slope changed from -.137 
(n.s.) to -.271 (n.s.) when mortality was salient. 
 From the opposite perspective, that of the effect of the presence (absence) of an 
expertise cue on strong arguments, the cue’s qualities in the control condition vanished in the 
mortality salience condition. Worldview (which was centered with a mean of 0) was not a 
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part of the equation, but for dependent variables on which, incidentally, worldview had a 
significant main effect (i.e., Aad and behavioral intentions), the presence of an expertise cue 
attenuated the slope of argument quality, from .559 (n.s.) to .107 (n.s.) for Aad and from 
1.614 (p < .05) to -.349 (n.s.) for behavioral intentions. The cue was modestly additive for 
Abrand, from .603 (n.s.) to .729 (n.s.), but the difference in slopes (.126) was considerably less 
than the difference in the control condition (.761 - .121 = .640). 
 Thus, the diagnosticity of argument quality for the expertise cue (which was 
discussed under Additivity, attenuation, and bias) appeared to have varied according to 
participants’ primary motivation. Under a presumed accuracy motivation, argument quality 
seemed to be diagnostic, but under a nonconscious defense motivation it was not, when other 
inputs (including, possibly, worldview) likely were deemed more applicable. 
 
H4: Mortality salience as a moderator of the accessibility of worldview 
 The interaction between mortality salience and worldview (M x W) was significant 
for Aad, t(132) = -2.122, p < .05, and behavioral intentions, t(132) = -2.448, p < .05, but not
for Abrand. These results provide partial support for H4, namely, that mortality salience 
moderated the influence of worldview. 
 Aad = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x worldview + b3 x mortality salience x 
worldview 
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.002 M + -.458 W* + -.380 M x W*
Abrand = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x worldview + b3 x mortality salience x 
worldview 
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.023 M +-.150 W + -.076 M x W 
 




BI  =  4.514 + .091 M +-.985 W** + -.660 M x W*
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
A probe of the significant interaction in Aad revealed that in the control condition the 
coefficient for worldview was .136 (n.s.) (Table 7), which changed to -.428 (n.s.) when 
mortality became salient. Their difference is represented in the slope for the interaction term, 
-.564 (n.s.), and a graph of the slopes is displayed in Figure 22. For behavioral intentions, the 
coefficient for worldview when mortality was not salient was .775 (n.s.) (Table 9), but when 
mortality was salient the coefficient was -1.800 (p < .05). The interaction is displayed in 
Figure 24. For Abrand, the phenomenon was not evident, which is represented by the flat 
slopes in Figure 23.  
 It seemed that making mortality salient may have increased the accessibility of 
participants’ worldview, which, in turn, could have moderated the effect of other variables. 
This possibility is tested in H5 and H6. 
 
H5: 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and expertise cue 
 It was predicted that mortality might moderate of interaction of worldview and 
expertise cue, but the tests of the 3-way interaction among mortality salience, worldview, and 
an expertise cue (M x W x C) were nonsignificant. Thus H5, was not supported.  
 Aad = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x worldview + b3 x expertise cue  
 + b4 x mortality salience x worldview + b5 x mortality salience x 
expertise cue + b6 x worldview x expertise cue + b7 x mortality salience x 
worldview x expertise cue  
 
Aad = 4.508 + -.002 M + -.458 W* + -.083 C + -.380 M x W* + .060 M x C
+ .154 W x C + .067 M x W x C
Abrand = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x worldview + b3 x expertise cue  
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 + b4 x mortality salience x worldview + b5 x mortality salience x 
expertise cue + b6 x worldview x expertise cue + b7 x mortality salience x 
worldview x expertise cue 
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.023 M + -.150 W + -.100 C + -.076 M x W + -.082 M x C  
 + .002 W x C + .126 M x W x C
BI  =  b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x worldview + b3 x expertise cue  
 + b4 x mortality salience x worldview + b5 x mortality salience x  
 expertise cue + b6 x worldview x expertise cue + b7 x mortality salience x 
 worldview x expertise cue 
 
BI  =  4.514 + .091 M + -.985 W + -.154 C + -.660 M x W* + -.108 M x C  
 + -.360 W x C + .362 M x W x C  
 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
Because the 2-way interaction of mortality salience and worldview was significant, 
this 3-way interaction was followed up with post-hoc probes. For Aad, the 2-way interaction 
between worldview and an expertise cue was -.075 (n.s.) (Table 7), but when mortality was 
made salient, the term was -.604 (n.s.). Thus, in the control condition the simple simple slope 
of worldview when a cue was absent changed from .136 (n.s.) to .061 (n.s.) when the cue was 
present. In the mortality salience condition, however, when worldview presumably was more 
accessible, the slope changed from -.428 when the cue was absent to -1.031 (p < .05) when 
the cue was present. The 3-way interaction is depicted in Figure 25. This suggests that 
worldview, when made more accessible, influenced the evaluation of expertise cues. The 2-
way interaction of worldview and an expertise cue assessed in H1 was the slope of the 
interaction when mortality was not salient. 
 For Abrand, in which worldview was not a significant predictor, the coefficient of the 
interaction of worldview and expertise cue changed from .011 (n.s.) (Table 8) in the control 
condition to .444 (n.s.) in the mortality salience condition. Thus, in the control condition the 
simple simple slope of worldview when a cue was absent changed negligibly, from -.065 
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(n.s.) to -.054 (n.s.), when the cue was present. In the mortality salience condition, however, 
the slope changed from -.597 (n.s.) when the cue was absent to -.152 (n.s.) when the cue was 
present. The slopes in Figure 26 illustrate the relationship. 
 For behavioral intentions, in which worldview was a significant predictor and the 
worldview-mortality salience interaction was significant, the term for the interaction of 
worldview and expertise cue changed from -1.535 (n.s.) (Table 9) in the control condition 
to .779 (n.s.) in the mortality salience condition, the difference being equivalent to -2.314, the 
slope of the 3-way interaction. In the control condition, then, the simple simple slope of 
worldview when a cue was absent changed from .775 (n.s.) to -.759 (n.s.), when the cue was 
present. In the mortality salience condition the slope changed from -1.800 (p < .05) when the 
cue was absent to -1.021 (n.s.) when the cue was present, as illustrated in Figure 27.  
The simple slope of expertise cue, independent of worldview, changed little from the 
control condition to the mortality salience condition, which suggests that the change in the 
interaction term stemmed from mortality salience making participants’ worldview more 
accessible, and not from any direct effect of mortality salience on the expertise cue. 
 
H6: 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and argument quality 
 It was predicted also that mortality salience might moderate the interaction of 
worldview and argument quality, but tests of a 3-way interaction among mortality salience, 
worldview, and argument quality (M x W x A) were nonsignificant. Thus, H6 was not 
supported.  
 Aad = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x worldview + b3 x argument quality  
 + b4 x mortality salience x worldview + b5 x mortality salience x 
 argument quality + b6 x worldview x argument quality + b7 x mortality  
 salience x worldview x argument quality 
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Aad = 4.508 + -.002 M + -.458 W* + .109 A + .057 M x A + -.380 M x W*
+ -.143 W x A + .034 M x W x A  
 
Abrand = b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x worldview + b3 x argument quality  
 + b4 x mortality salience x worldview + b5 x mortality salience x 
 argument quality + b6 x worldview x argument quality + b7 x mortality  
 salience x worldview x argument quality 
 
Abrand = 4.490 + -.023 M + -.150 W + .277 A* + -.076 M x W + .056 M x A  
 + .067 W x A + .082 M x W x A
BI  =  b0 + b1 x mortality salience + b2 x worldview + b3 x argument quality  
 + b4 x mortality salience x worldview + b5 x mortality salience x 
 argument quality + b6 x worldview x argument quality + b7 x mortality  
 salience x worldview x argument quality 
 
BI  =  4.514 + .091 M + -.985 W** + .404 A** + -.660 M x W* + -.087 M x A  
 + -.284 W x A + .049 M x W x A  
 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01
Because mortality salience was shown to moderate the influence of worldview, a 
post-hoc probe of the possible effect of mortality salience on the 2-way interaction of 
worldview and argument quality was conducted. When mortality was not salient, the slope of 
the 2-way interaction was .012 (n.s.) (Table 7), but when mortality was salient the coefficient 
was -.649 (n.s.). Thus, in the control condition the simple simple slope of worldview given 
weak arguments changed from .136 (n.s.) to .148 (n.s.) when arguments were strong. In the 
mortality salience condition, however, when worldview presumably was more accessible, the 
slope changed from -.428 when arguments were weak to -1.076 (p < .05) when arguments 
were strong (Fig. 28). This suggests that making mortality salient may have increased the 
accessibility of worldview, which, in turn, influenced the relationship between worldview 
and argument quality in their effect on Aad.
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For Abrand, the interaction term increased from .228 (n.s.) to .485 (n.s.) (Table 8). In 
the control condition, then, the simple simple slope of worldview when arguments were weak 
changed from -.065 (n.s.) to .164 (n.s.) when arguments were strong, and in the mortality 
salience condition the slope changed from -.597 (n.s.) when arguments were weak to -.112 
(n.s.) when arguments were strong (Fig. 29). Because worldview was not a significant 
predictor of Abrand, the change in slopes likely came from the influence of mortality salience 
on argument quality. Indeed, the simple slope of argument quality increased from .121 (n.s.) 
in the control condition to .603 (n.s.) in the mortality salience condition. This apparent effect 
of mortality salience on argument quality suggests that mortality salience may have led to a 
nonconscious defense motivation, which, in turn, could have resulted in increased systematic 
processing. 
 For behavioral intentions, in which both worldview and argument quality were 
significant predictors, the interaction term changed from -.756 (n.s.) (Table 9) in the control 
condition to .305 (n.s.) in the mortality salience condition. When arguments were weak, the 
simple simple slope of worldview changed from .775 (n.s) in the control condition to -1.800 
(p < .05) in the mortality salience condition. Likewise, given strong arguments, the slope of 
worldview declined from .019 (n.s.) to -1.495 (p < .05) when mortality was made salient (Fig. 
30). Systematic processing seems to have increased, too, as the simple slope of argument 
quality increased from .461 (n.s.) in the control condition to 1.614 (p < .01) in the mortality 
salience condition. This change is due likely to the both the increased accessibility of 
participants’ worldview in the mortality salience condition and well as to an increase in 
systematic processing. This pattern of results suggests that mortality salience may have led to 
an increase in both systematic and heuristic processing. 
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Summary of results 
The more relativist one’s worldview was, the more critical one was of the ad and the 
less likely one was to purchase or try the advertised product. As a main effect, worldview 
was chronically accessible, but worldview was not a significant predictor of participants’ 
attitudes toward the brand itself. This pattern contrasted with the main effect of argument 
quality, which was a significant positive predictor of attitudes toward the brand and 
behavioral intentions but not of participants’ attitudes toward the ads touting the product. In 
line with the pattern of the main effect of worldview, a significant two-way interaction of 
worldview and mortality salience predicted Aad and behavioral intentions but not Abrand. The 
magnitude of the negative slope of worldview grew when participants’ mortality was made 
salient. Thus, mortality salience seems to have increased the accessibility of participants’ 
worldview, leading them to be even more critical of the ad and reporting being even less 
likely to try the advertised product. These three significant patterns of results formed the 
foundation of the tentative but nonsignificant results that followed. 
It was discovered that the valence of the expertise cue depended on the input that was 
deemed diagnostic for evaluating the cue. Argument quality seemed to be diagnostic for 
determining the valence of the cue. When arguments were strong, the cue had an additive 
effect, but when arguments were weak the cue was ascribed a negative valence. That is, the 
cue had a negative effect when arguments were weak. Although this effect was clear for 
Abrand and behavioral intentions, in which argument quality was a significant predictor, the 
effect was more qualified for Aad, in which worldview was a significant predictor. When 
arguments were strong, the cue was less negative than when arguments were weak. When 
mortality salience made participants’ worldview more accessible, however, this effect 
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disappeared altogether, as the worldview appeared to be more diagnostic for evaluating the 
cue.  
If worldview was a source of heuristics that was used in the evaluations, then 
mortality salience seemed to have led to an increase in heuristic processing. Mortality 
salience also appeared to cause an increase in systematic processing. Compared to the control 
condition, strong arguments resulted in more positive evaluations and weak arguments led to 
more negative evaluations. Thus, mortality salience appeared to result in an increase in both 
heuristic and systematic processing. 
Worldview did not interact with the expertise cue in a statistically significant manner. 
However, when the presumed accessibility of worldview was increased via mortality salience, 
worldview seemed to become diagnostic for the cue, b = -1.031 (p < .05) in predicting Aad.
Worldview did not interact with argument quality in a statistically significant manner, 
either. Indeed, each of those variables, worldview and argument quality, seemed to have 
independent influence on either Aad or Abrand, but not both. Behavioral intentions was the 
only dependent variable on which both variables had a significant main effect, and an 





Purpose and goals 
This dissertation’s primary unique contribution was the introduction of worldview 
and a demonstration of the insight the construct can bring to traditional persuasion research. 
This dissertation also contributed to progress toward a fuller understanding of existing 
theories of communication and social psychology and explored points of connection. 
People have different ways of making sense of what they experience, and researchers 
can gain greater insight into human behavior by understanding how people interpret the 
world around them. Differences in how people process information can influence how they 
communicate and how they respond to persuasive messages. This dissertation undertook to 
test the possibility that a person’s worldview could influence the way he or she processes an 
ad. In addition, making mortality salient might change they way people process information 
and lead to an increased reliance on one’s worldview when evaluating persuasive messages 
such as ads.  
The dissertation also sought to explore a possible theoretical link between the 
heuristic-systematic model and terror management theory, namely, that a mortality salience 
induction might lead people to process information defensively. This nexus might illuminate 
persuasion process and provide greater insight into how people are persuaded and why they 
might be resistant to persuasion efforts. 
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 An experimental examination of these fundamental issues should examine 
characteristics of a persuasive message (O’Keefe, 2003) as well as characteristics of the 
audience (Oliver, 2002). In this dissertation, two of the four independent variables (argument 
quality and expertise cue) were properties of the persuasive message, while the other two 
variables (worldview and mortality salience) concerned the person who encountered the 
message. The interrelationship of four independent variables drawn from several theoretical 
fields was complex, but that complexity is sometimes necessary if one wishes to gain a more 
comprehensive and nuanced understanding of media effects and how these variables might 
act in concert. The research presented here adds to the body of traditional persuasion research, 
given that some of these variables—and particularly the interplay between and among 
them—have not previously received focal attention in a comprehensive manner. 
 
Interpretation of findings 
 
This dissertation identified three significant findings. A person’s worldview can be a 
significant predictor of how a persuasive message is processed. Further, the influence of 
one’s worldview can be moderated by making mortality salient. This dissertation also 
discovered separate main effects for worldview and argument quality in predicting attitudes. 
Feldman (1999) and Feldman and Lynch (1988) provide a useful explanatory 
framework for interpreting the results of this dissertation. Rather than focusing on 
independent variables or their effects, the framework comprises four processes: accessibility, 
diagnosticity, motivation, and capacity. Accessibility refers to the availability of a given type 
of a person’s knowledge at a particular time, and that knowledge may be chronically or 
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temporarily accessible. Diagnosticity refers to the relevance of that knowledge to another 
construct of interest [Chen and Chaiken (1999) used “available” to denote the idea of 
accessible heuristics and “applicable” to refer to heuristics that were considered diagnostic]. 
Motivation is held to have a directive and energizing character in focusing resources and can 
have varying levels of intensity. Capacity refers to an individual’s attentional resources in a 
given situation. For a cultural stereotype to be applied in a given situation, for example, the 
stereotype must be accessible within an observer, the stereotype must be deemed relevant, or 
diagnostic, to a particular target that the observer views, the observer must be motivated to 
characterize the target, and the observer must have had sufficient practice for the stereotype 
to be applied easily. 
This dissertation defined worldview primarily as a chronically accessible set of 
assumptions about the world. However, it appears that mortality salience may have increased 
the influence of worldview temporarily so that participants’ worldview was used to evaluate 
the ads. Following Feldman (1999) and Feldman and Lynch (1988), then, participants’ 
cognitive processes appeared to occur in the following sequence: motivation led to 
accessibility, which led to diagnosticity. That is, making mortality salient induced anxiety 
and a nonconscious defense motivation among participants who viewed the ads. That anxiety 
increased the accessibility of participants’ worldview, which was applied in evaluating the 
cues and arguments in the ads. This possible explanation for the interaction effect will be 
described in more detail subsequently. In the Feldman and Lynch process framework, the 
capacity for a particular type of heuristic thought, or worldview, like other types of 
knowledge structures that operate across contexts, is presumed to have been developed 
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previously by repeated long-term practice (Feldman, 1999; Feldman & Lynch, 1988). A 
worldview, like values and dispositions, would develop as part of daily experience. 
 
Worldview 
 RQ1 sought to assess the main effect of participants’ worldview on their evaluations 
of ads. A relativist worldview had a significant main effect on Aad and behavioral intentions 
in a negative direction. All else equal, participants who had a more relativist worldview 
tended to be less likely to have a favorable evaluation of an ad and less likely to purchase or 
try the advertised product. Thus, a person’s worldview appears to be an important factor in 
predicting the effectiveness of persuasive messages such as ads. This effect demonstrated 
that persuasive messages can be interpreted in different ways, depending on a person’s 
worldview. A message that generates a favorable attitude among people who hold a 
traditionalist worldview might generate an unfavorable attitude among people whose 
worldview is more relativist. 
 As an individual difference variable, therefore, the construct of worldview appears to 
yield insight into understanding information processing. Along with personality, gender, 
ethnicity, (Oliver, 2002), an appreciation of the role of worldview may help scholars 
understand how media messages can have different effects on people. Persuasive messages 
that are congruent with one’s personality type and self-concept have been shown to be more 
effective than messages that are incongruent (Wheeler, Petty, & Bizer, 2005). Consistent 
with that finding, then, messages that match one’s worldview seem to be better regarded, as 
well. 
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 As a lens that filters what one sees, it appears that a participant’s worldview shaped 
the way the ads were perceived. A relativist worldview was associated generally with a more 
unfavorable evaluation of the ads, regardless of whether the ads contained strong or weak 
arguments or whether the ads featured an expertise cue or no cue. This stance toward the ads 
likely resulted from a conviction that many truth claims are inherently suspect. Because 
people with a relativist worldview tend to discount the possibility of unbiased and objective 
knowledge, participants with a relativist worldview had less favorable attitudes toward the 
message and its claims. This is consistent with the pattern of finding significant results for 
Aad and behavioral intentions but not for Abrand. The core constructs of a relativist worldview 
regarding truth and certainty were deemed relevant to forming an attitude concerning the 
message itself but were not diagnostic in forming an attitude concerning the product that was 
being promoted. 
It bears noting that the arguments and brands used in this experiment were adapted 
from materials used in previous studies of persuasion, and the addition of worldview to those 
studies as an individual difference variable might increase the amount of variance explained. 
Worldview can be incorporated as a dispositional variable along with the message-based 
variables of argument quality and cues to aid researchers in gaining a greater understanding 
of media effects. The ads from which the arguments were drawn manipulated a celebrity cue, 
not expertise, so in future research it would be uncertain how a relativist worldview might 
influence the effect of a celebrity cue or several other cues used in earlier persuasion research. 
 In addition to finding support for the idea that worldviews function as a filter on the 
way persuasive messages are interpreted, this dissertation contributed to the explication of 
the theoretical construct of worldview. Worldview was defined primarily as dispositional and 
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chronically accessible, but the results suggest that the degree of its influence on information 
processing can be heightened or attenuated. A defense motivation, for example, may 
temporarily make a person’s worldview even more accessible in a given situation. Because 
there was a significant main effect, worldview appeared to be chronically accessible, and 
because there was a significant 2-way interaction with mortality salience (as discussed later), 
it seems that the accessibility of worldview can be varied temporarily, as well. 
 
Worldview and argument quality affected different dependent variables 
 Participants appeared to make a distinction between a particular product and the ad 
that promoted the product. Argument quality failed to predict Aad while being a significant 
predictor of Abrand and behavioral intentions. Worldview, on the contrary, failed to predict 
Abrand but was a significant predictor of Aad and behavioral intentions. When both Aad and 
Abrand were entered into the same equation as repeated measures, neither argument quality 
nor worldview predicted both variables. Thus, argument quality and worldview predicted 
different, though related, constructs. A relativist worldview seemed to be more pertinent to 
evaluation of the communication, while arguments were more properly connected to the 
brand. This finding is consistent also with the persuasion knowledge model, which posits that 
people seek to hold attitudes that are valid not only regarding the topic at hand but also 
regarding the communicator. This dissertation did not test this possibility, but the pattern of 
results seems to support the idea that participants’ Aad primarily concerned the communicator 
and Abrand primarily concerned the topic or product. Thus, worldview was more applicable in 
forming an attitude toward the persuasive message, and argument quality was more 
diagnostic in forming an attitude toward the advertised product itself. This finding supports 
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the premise in the persuasion knowledge model that people seek to hold valid attitudes about 
both the communicator and the topic of the message. 
 What is unclear however, is the net effect of a relativist worldview and argument 
quality. Indeed, argument quality was a significant positive predictor of behavioral intentions, 
while a relativist worldview was a significant negative predictor. If the upper end of the 
worldview measure indicates a relativist worldview and the lower end indicates a 
traditionalist worldview, then strong arguments should be even more effective among people 
who hold a traditionalist worldview in predicting behavioral intentions. Thus, the joint effect 
of strong arguments and traditional worldview would be additive. 
 To caution against committing a Type II error, it should be noted that the finding of 
separate effects does not mean that argument quality had no effect on Aad or that worldview 
had no effect on Abrand. It could be that argument quality and worldview had weak effects that 
were not strong enough to be detected. 
 
Mortality salience 
 RQ3 sought to assess what direct effect mortality salience might have on the 
evaluation of the ads. No evidence of a direct effect was found. H1 predicted that mortality 
salience would moderate the influence of worldview. The interaction of worldview and 
mortality salience was statistically significant in predicting Aad and behavioral intentions. 
Based on terror management theory, it was predicted that making mortality salient would 
make participants’ worldview more accessible. And, indeed, it appeared that making 
mortality salient increased the accessibility of participants’ worldview in evaluating the ads 
and reporting behavioral intentions. The interaction suggests that the accessibility of a 
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chronically accessible worldview can be heightened. Consistent with terror management 
theory, making mortality salient led to an increased reliance on one’s worldview. Participants 
who tended toward a relativist worldview appeared to become even more relativist in 
evaluating the ads and reporting behavioral intentions, while those participants who tended to 
be traditionalist seemed to become more traditionalist. 
The interaction between mortality salience and worldview suggests that an increase in 
anxiety associated with mortality salience served to increase heuristic processing. One’s 
worldview served as a heuristic that participants would employ in evaluating the ads. The 
habitual inferences associated with a worldview seemed to exert a greater influence in 
attitude formation among participants who were aware of their own mortality. If worldview 
is a source of heuristics, then a defense motivation resulted in a greater degree of heuristic 
processing, resulting in attitudes consistent with one’s worldview.  
 While mortality salience was not a statistically significant moderator of argument 
quality or expertise cue (RQ4), it seems that the manipulation may have had an effect on 
participants’ processing modes. Mortality salience led to anxiety, which may have led both to 
an increase in systematic processing and to more heuristic processing, especially with regard 
to participants’ worldview. Greater attention to argument quality is an indicator of systematic 
processing. In the mortality salience condition, strong arguments were judged stronger, and 
weak arguments were judged weaker, than in the control condition. This possible relationship 
between mortality salience and argument quality mirrors that of involvement and argument 
quality in other studies (e.g., Petty et al., 1983). In studies manipulating involvement, 
inducing greater involvement results in greater scrutiny of the arguments so that, compared to 
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the low-involvement condition, strong arguments are deemed stronger, and weak arguments 
are considered to be weaker.  
 That pattern of results in this dissertation was nonsignificant, however, and it should 
be tempered further by noting that other research has found that mortality salience increases 
heuristic-type processing, but not systematic-type processing. Mortality salience affected 
how participants responded to a threat to their cultural worldview when they were engaged in 
an experiential and associative mode of processing. However, when participants were asked 
to take a rational-analytic stance, the effects of mortality salience disappeared (Simon et al., 
1997).  
 Mortality salience may have led to an increase in heuristic processing, as well, as 
suggested by the relationship of mortality salience, worldview, and expertise cue (H5), in 
which the possible moderating influence of worldview on the expertise cue appeared to be 
stronger in the mortality salience condition than in the control condition. 
 
Worldview as a moderator of an expertise cue 
H3 tested the prediction that worldview would moderate the effect of the expertise 
cue. Worldview was not found to be a statistically significant moderator of participants’ 
perceptions of the expertise cue. The 2-way interaction of worldview and expertise cue tested 
in H3 was the slope of the interaction when mortality was not salient. However, post-hoc 
probes of H6—which tested the 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and 
expertise cue—detected a possible 3-way relationship that could be interpreted as an 
extension of the 2-way interaction between mortality salience and worldview. That is, 
mortality salience seemed to moderate the relationship between worldview and expertise cue. 
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The mortality salience induction seemed to make participants’ worldview more accessible, 
and when their worldview was accessible, the slope for the worldview-cue interaction 
changed, while the slope of the simple effect of the expertise cue remained relatively 
unchanged. This pattern of results suggests that participants’ worldview, when made 
sufficiently accessible, moderated the way the expertise cue was perceived. 
 That the simple effect of expertise cue changed little from the control condition to the 
mortality salience condition suggests that the change in the interaction term stemmed from 
mortality salience making participants’ worldview more accessible. If the simple slope of the 
expertise cue had changed, then that would suggest that making mortality salient led 
participants to evaluate the cue differently for some other reason. Thus, the 2-way interaction 
of worldview and expertise cue that was tested in H3 was not significant because worldview 
may not have been accessible enough to be diagnostic. 
 
Worldview as a moderator of argument quality 
 H2 tested the prediction that worldview would moderate the effect of argument 
quality. Worldview was not a statistically significant moderator of the arguments for any of 
the dependent variables. However, this null result, like the nonsignificant interaction of 
worldview and expertise cue, might have occurred because worldview was not sufficiently 
accessible. Post-hoc probes found little change for Aad and Abrand, but the larger change in the 
slope for behavioral intentions serves as a caution against making a Type II error. Both 
argument quality and worldview had main effects in predicting behavioral intentions, and the 
change in slope suggests that worldview might moderate argument quality if both main 
effects are strong enough.  
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Further, the influence of mortality salience on the 2-way interaction of worldview and 
argument quality (H6) suggests that mortality salience might have increased the accessibility 
of worldview, which, in turn, influenced the relationship between worldview and argument 
quality in their effect on behavioral intentions. For Aad, mortality salience appeared to change 
the relationship modestly. For Abrand, worldview was not a significant predictor, and the 3-
way interaction changed little from the 2-way interaction, in which mortality salience 





The results of this dissertation contribute toward a better understanding of dual-path 
models of persuasion. One key distinction between the heuristic-systematic model and other 
dual-process accounts of persuasion such as the elaboration likelihood model, is that heuristic 
and systematic processing are held to co-occur. This model has been expanded with the 
proposal of three hypotheses—additivity, attenuation, and bias—and three different 
motivations for processing messages—accuracy, impression, and defense (Chen & Chaiken, 
1999). Relatively little research has explored the impression and defense motivations. Even 
less has been written about possible effects of the different motivations on additivity, 
attenuation, or bias.  
The results of this dissertation suggest that one’s motivation can alter the 
relationships predicted by additivity, attenuation, and bias and are consistent with the 
explanation that a defense motivation resulted in an increase in both systematic processing 
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and heuristic processing. Based on the heuristic-systematic model, this dissertation predicted 
the combined effect of strong arguments and an expertise cue would be greater than either 
factor alone. Argument quality was a significant positive predictor of Abrand and behavioral 
intentions, but the main effect of the expertise cue was nonsignificant, and the sign was 
negative. Although the sign of the main effect of the expertise cue was negative, it should be 
noted that the manipulation check of the expertise cue suggested that the cue resulted in an 
increase in perceived expertise. This difference can be explained with the addition of 
worldview as a covariate to the equation of the manipulation check. Expertise cue was a 
positive predictor and worldview was a negative predictor of perceived expertise. 
 Because the sign of argument quality was positive and the sign of the expertise cue 
was negative, however, their joint effect should not be expected to be additive. However, for 
strong arguments, the effect of the expertise cue was additive in predicting a favorable 
attitude, while for weak arguments the cue contributed to an even more unfavorable attitude. 
That is, an expertise cue made strong arguments stronger and weak arguments weaker. The 
quality of the arguments biased the interpretation of the expertise cue, or in other words, the 
quality of the arguments was diagnostic for determining the valence of the expertise cue. 
Thus, the diagnosticity of argument quality was contingent on the accessibility of alternative 
inputs (Feldman & Lynch, 1988) such as worldview.  
 It seemed that the effect found in this dissertation disappeared, though, when 
mortality was salient, as argument quality was no longer diagnostic for the expertise cue. 
Making mortality salient appeared to have influenced both systematic and heuristic 
processing and also influenced the patterns that would be predicted by the HSM bias 
hypothesis. Apparently, mortality salience made participants’ worldview more accessible, 
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which in turn became more diagnostic in interpreting the cue. Thus, given a presumed 
accuracy motivation, argument quality was diagnostic for interpreting the expertise cue, but 
given a nonconscious defense motivation induced by mortality salience, worldview was more 
diagnostic. 
 The possibility that argument quality was diagnostic for determining the valence of 
the cue is consistent with other studies, such as Solomon et al. (1996), in which participants 
relied strength of arguments for or against comprehensive exams, in part, to infer the 
perceived expertise of a source (high school senior vs. Harvard professor). In similar scenario, 
Reimer, Mata, & Stoecklin (2004) used a mediational analysis to find that participants 
inferred source expertise, in part, from the quality of the arguments used. These findings are 
inconsistent with the HSM co-occurrence principle, in that systematic and heuristic 
processing are held to be largely independent.  
The results of this dissertation also shed light on the potential impact of the defense 
motivation. If mortality salience induces a nonconscious defense motivation, then the defense 
motivation appeared to result in an increase in both systematic and heuristic processing. The 
defense motivation also appeared to influence the interaction of systematic and heuristic 
processing, as suggested by the change in the slopes of argument quality and expertise cue. It 
seems that a defense motivation induced via mortality salience influenced the way persuasive 
messages were processed. Apparently, the defense motivation did so (1) by making 
worldview more accessible and (2) by increasing heuristic processing in general. The defense 
motivation also seemed to increase systematic processing, causing participants to process the 
arguments more closely.  
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Similar results might not hold if one engaged in a conscious shift to a defense 
motivation, such as might occur with forewarning. The HSM suggested that when people are 
motivated to process defensively they might attend to the message more and generate more 
counterarguments. However, the results presented here suggest that mortality salience might 
have led to an increase in heuristic processing. Most descriptions (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 
1999; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992) of the defense motivation seem to focus a conscious 
defense. When one’s attitudes are threatened, one actively seeks to defend one’s deeply held 
convictions about oneself and world. Arguments might be subject to greater scrutiny so that 
one can generate counterarguments. The conscious defense motivation would also lead to a 
selective application of heuristics for defensive purposes, but it would not necessarily lead to 
an overall increase in the heuristic mode of processing. 
 The heuristic-systematic model does not predict any particular directional effect for 
the defense motivation, only that people with a defense motivation will process persuasive 
messages in a manner different than people whose primary motivation is one of accuracy. 
Based on the results of this dissertation, one can predict in future research that a defense 




RQ5 sought to assess the interrelationship of mortality salience, argument quality, 
and expertise cue, and it was discovered that a 3-way interaction was a significant (p < .05)
in predicting behavioral intentions. Worldview did not have a main effect on Abrand, so 
making worldview more accessible should not have affected the valence of the expertise cue 
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for Abrand. Argument quality did not have a main effect on Aad, so argument quality should 
not have biased the valence of expertise cue for Aad. Both worldview and argument quality 
had a significant main effect on behavioral intentions, however. When worldview was less 
accessible, the valence of the cue was biased by the strength of the arguments, but when 
worldview was more accessible, the cue’s valence was moderated by worldview. When 
worldview was accessible, it became diagnostic for the expertise cue. When worldview was 
less accessible, the argument quality was diagnostic.  
 Although the systematic and heuristic paths are held to be largely independent of each 
other in exerting an influence over attitudes, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) reported that 
heuristic processing can bias systematic processing. The data in this dissertation suggest that 
the bias can flow in both directions, that is, that just as the interpretation of an ambiguous 
argument can be biased by heuristic cues, so also the interpretation of an ambiguous cue can 
be influenced by systematic processing. 
 The operant motivation in the control condition can be assumed to be one of accuracy, 
the traditional focus of most persuasion research. Changes wrought by the induction of a 
defense motivation in the mortality salience condition illustrate the way in which a change in 
motivation can influence how persuasive messages are processed.  
 
Persuasion Knowledge Model 
Participants’ knowledge of persuasion may have influenced the their evaluations of 
the ads. The quality of the arguments biased the influence of the expertise cue such that the 
effect of the expertise cue was additive for strong arguments but attenuating for weak 
arguments. These results are congruent also with the persuasion knowledge model (Friestad 
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& Wright, 1994). In the context of weak arguments an expertise cue may have been viewed 
as a “persuasion technique,” as participants’ persuasion knowledge influenced the 
diagnosticity of argument quality for the expertise cue. 
 In this dissertation, topic and agent knowledge were nonexistent, as the product and 
brand name were fictitious. Of the three types of knowledge formulated in model—topic, 
agent, and persuasion—the only knowledge available to participants was persuasion 
knowledge, and this knowledge base was used to interpret the expertise cue in the control 
condition. 
 The “change-of-meaning” principle could have been operant via the diagnosticity of 
argument quality, wherein weak arguments caused the expertise cue to be perceived as a 
tactic. Thus, in this experiment, when strong arguments were present they were used to 
assign a positive valence to the expertise cue, but when the arguments were weak, they 
resulted in a negative valence being attributed to the expertise cue, which in that case could 
have been perceived as a persuasion tactic. When a nonconscious defense motivation was 
induced, however, and participants’ worldview was more accessible, the worldview was 
diagnostic for determining the cue’s valence.  
 
Terror Management Theory 
 This dissertation also contributed to a greater understanding of terror management 
theory by demonstrating that mortality salience influences the way in which people process 
persuasive messages, even those messages that apparently have little consequence to them, 
such as ads for unknown mouthwash or razors. The linkage of the TMT mortality salience 
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with the HSM defense motivation suggests a possible theoretical connection and could 
encourage research that spans and informs both research programs. 
Cultural worldviews are “humanly constructed beliefs about reality” shared by groups 
of people that function to reduce the potential of terror arising from one’s awareness of death 
(Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004, p. 16). Cultural worldviews offer 1) beliefs 
about reality that provide a sense of meaning, order, and stability to one’s existence, 2) social 
norms or approved ways of enhancing one’s self-esteem, and 3) a form of literal or symbolic 
transcendence of death. 
It is important to note that the definition of worldview in this dissertation primarily 
concerns the first of the three elements of the TMT definition, namely a way of perceiving 
and understanding reality, and not necessarily the latter two elements. Of course, the three 
elements can be (and often are) related. Norms and values are founded in a worldview, but 
they are distinct in that they are guides to behavior and not a lens through which one views 
the world. If one believes, for example, that “What goes around comes around,” a cyclical 
holistic perspective in which things are inter-related, then that belief will inform one’s 
standards of social behavior regarding generosity. 
The Attitudes About Reality scale measured epistemological assumptions, and not 
ways to transcend death. Items that tapped social norms did so in terms of social relations, 
not self-esteem. Thus, the scale did not operationalize fully the construct of cultural 
worldview as established in TMT. The instrument operationalized the construct of worldview 
as described in this dissertation and defined by Koltko-Rivera (2004), namely a set of core 
constructs with which people make sense of the world.  
88
One key distinction between the influence of worldview as defined in this dissertation 
and the role of cultural worldview in TMT is that in TMT the defense of one’s worldview is 
purposive. TMT is built on a functional approach, in that people make recourse to their 
worldview for the purpose of reducing anxiety. People adopt a worldview for the purpose of 
allaying existential anxiety. The induction of mortality salience leads people to defend their 
worldview nonconsciously for the purpose of reducing their awareness of death. It is possible 
that some of the effects are not due to that central proposition. It may be that some of the 
effects are due to a greater nonconscious reliance on one’s worldview as a form of habitual 
patterns of thought. 
 
Terror Management Theory’s functional explanation 
This dissertation holds that everyone has a worldview, i.e. a way of making sense of 
the world, and this worldview is not intended primarily to reduce death-related anxiety. The 
purpose of a worldview extends beyond enabling one to cope with an awareness of death. A 
worldview exists to help one make sense of reality in general, not just the reality of one’s 
own mortality (Koltko-Rivera, 2004). A worldview may or may not include a religion-related 
component, for instance.  
Mortality salience leads to an increase in anxiety, which leads to a greater 
accessibility of habitual thought processes and core constructs. This increase is a byproduct 
of heightened anxiety, but no purpose is implied. 
Although TMT has yielded a wealth of insights, some of the research suffers from a 
poor operationalization of a cultural worldview, as initially defined. It is important not to 
confound “beliefs about the nature of reality” with self-esteem, identity, lifestyle, or target-
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specific attitudes. A cultural worldview has been equated with university affiliation (See & 
Petty, 2006; Solomon et al., 1995) and attitudes toward personal alcohol consumption 
(Shehryar & Hunt, 2005). These findings are theoretically valuable, but expanding the 
definition of “cultural worldview” to include social identity and target-specific attitudes 
jeopardizes the studies’ construct validity. Greater insight could be derived by maintaining 
sharp distinctions between worldview and other related constructs and specifying the 
relations among them. 
Ferraro et al. (2005) applied terror management theory in a consumer-choice context 
and made a valuable connection between TMT and ego-depletion without confounding the 
constructs. They found that high mortality salience led to fewer indulgent choices among 
people for whom such choices were an important base of self-esteem. Likewise, people for 
whom limiting indulgent choices was not a significant source of self-esteem increased their 
indulgent choices when mortality salience was high. Mortality salience also increased 
intentions of charitable or socially conscious behavior among people for whom that was 
important. In other words, increased mortality salience intensified participants’ pre-existent 
tendencies toward a particular type of behavior. Although accessibility was not an explicit 
goal of the study, the results are consistent with the possibility that mortality salience resulted 
in an increased accessibility of learned patterns of behavior and thought. 
This proposed explanation that mortality salience leads to a greater accessibility of 
habitual patterns of thought is not new. Greenberg et al. (1995) tested the alternative 
explanation that the mortality salience induction merely made one’s values more accessible. 
In addition to the mortality salience manipulation, asking participants to reflect on the 
prospect of dying, and a control condition, in which participants were asked about watching 
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television, the researchers added a values condition in which participants were asked to write 
about their values. Then the participants were asked to read a hypothetical case about a 
prostitute from the perspective of a judge and set an appropriate level of bond. The authors 
found that priming people to think about values did not generate the same effects as the 
mortality salience induction. However, priming the conscious accessibility of one’s values is 
not the same as the mortality salience manipulation. Indeed, proximal (conscious) responses 
to the mortality salience induction lessen the manipulation’s effects. Distal responses in TMT 
are nonconscious. 
A better way to test that explanation would be to employ a design such as the one 
employed in this dissertation. Following a mortality salience or control manipulation, with a 
filler task, one can assess values, using, for instance, values items from the General Social 
Survey, as well as worldview measures such as the one employed in this dissertation and 
determine what effect they have on the dependent variables. 
Further support for the possible role of accessibility in explaining some TMT results 
can be found in Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Chatel (1992), who found 
that inducing mortality salience made conservatives become more negative toward outsiders, 
but liberals did not, presumably because tolerance is a chronically accessible core construct 
for liberals. Notably, that effect disappeared after the construct of tolerance was made more 
accessible. In other words, conservatives did not become more negative when primed with 
tolerance. If the one seeks to defend one’s cultural worldview as means of reducing death-
related anxiety, as TMT posits, and tolerance is not a key element of that worldview, then 
priming a construct that is not a core part of one’s cultural worldview should not reduce 
anxiety. One should still seek to reduce anxiety somehow. From an accessibility perspective, 
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however, the results could be interpreted as competing equally accessible constructs, namely, 
a conservative worldview made accessible via mortality salience and tolerance, made 
accessible via priming. 
TMT was tested (Simon et al., 1997) in relation to the cognitive-experiential self-
theory, which holds that the bulk of people’s cognitive activity does not involve effortful 
rational analysis but instead makes use of automatic effortless processing (Epstein & Pacini, 
1999). Participants who processed in an experiential mode exhibited the traditional effects of 
mortality salience, whereas participants who processed in rational mode did not, leading the 
authors to conclude that such effects are most likely when people rely on the experiential 
cognitive system. It has been suggested (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Arndt et 
al., 2004) that the rational-experiential framework bears some resemblance, in broad strokes, 
to other dual-process models such as the HSM. To the extent that the experiential system is 
analogous to the heuristic mode of processing, then these results suggest that mortality 
salience induction should lead to an increase in heuristic processing but not an increase in 
systematic processing. 
Much of the research in TMT involves measuring attitudes or behavior in areas that 
are closely related to one’s cultural worldview, such as nationalism or stereotyping. This 
dissertation, found however, that mortality salience affects attitudes toward advertising of 
razors and mouthwash, messages and objects that presumably have little to do with one’s 
worldview. A traditional TMT interpretation would hold that participants who tended toward 
a relativist worldview evaluated the arguments and cues more negatively than they would 
otherwise as a means of allaying existential anxiety. However, it is perhaps more likely that 
death-related anxiety caused sets of core assumptions to become more accessible in general, 
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not for the primary purpose of reducing existential anxiety. It is possible, also, that the 
heuristics themselves did not become more accessible, only that heuristic processing was 
intensified, leading to a greater use of heuristics in forming an attitude. This dissertation did 
not address technical distinctions such as the relationship between the heuristic processing 
mode and the heuristics themselves. 
In all likelihood, it is possible that the explanations are complementary. Mortality 
salience causes responses intended to ease anxiety over death and also generates a more 
widespread tendency toward habitual patterns of thought and behavior.  
 Most TMT studies, but certainly not all, induce mortality salience and subsequently 
present participants with a threat to their cultural worldview or self-esteem. In this 
dissertation, however, participants viewed ads for mouthwash and razors, personal 
consumption products that could hardly be construed as threats. 
 
Mediation in persuasion 
The pattern of results of this dissertation offer insight into a possible mediating 
mechanism for involvement in persuasion. In some ways, the results of the mortality salience 
manipulation paralleled those of dual-process studies manipulating involvement. That is, like 
studies in which more systematic and elaborative thought occurred under conditions of high 
involvement, making mortality salient resulted in greater attention to the strength of the 
arguments. In the mortality salience condition, strong arguments were deemed stronger and 
weak arguments were considered weaker than in the control condition. Thus, mortality 
salience, in addition to increasing heuristic processing by making worldview more accessible, 
may have led also to an increase in systematic processing. 
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 This similarity suggests that manipulations of involvement and mortality salience 
might share a common mediating variable of their effects. The influence of mortality salience 
on persuasion processes suggests that anxiety or arousal might be a central mediating 
mechanism in dual-path accounts of persuasion. 
Involvement is only one factor theorized to affect dual-path processing. Anxiety is 
another factor that produced similar results on each path. Anxiety in this dissertation, like 
involvement in other studies, appeared to influence the paths to persuasion. This suggests 
that anxiety may parallel involvement, producing similar effects. 
This account is highly speculative, however. Repeated studies have shown that affect 
and anxiety related to potential stressors such as fear or dental pain do not produce the same 
effects as mortality salience. Only existential anxiety produces mortality salience effects 
(Arndt et al., 2004). 
Perhaps arousal is a central mediating mechanism in dual-path models of persuasion. 
Arousal was not measured in this dissertation, but the lack of a measure of the presumed 
mediator does not necessarily rule out its plausibility (Sigall & Mills, 1998). Caffeine, a 
stimulant that generates higher levels of arousal, has also been found to produce an increase 
in systematic processing (Martin, Laing, Martin, & Mitchell, 2005). Perhaps higher levels of 
involvement also generate a concomitant level of arousal, which mediates the effect of 
involvement on information processing. The results of this dissertation regarding the 
diagnosticity of argument quality and worldview are consistent also with an explanation 
offered by Pham (1996), that arousal produces a selection effect in which some cues are 
perceived to be more diagnostic than other cues (which presumably are equally accessible). 
However, a test of the possible role of affect in explaining mortality salience effects found 
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that subliminal primes of mortality salience did not result changes in facial electromyography 
(Arndt, Allen, & Greenberg, 2001). Most TMT research has not included specific measures 
of theorized mediators, but failure to measure a mediator is not necessarily a shortcoming of 
the research (Sigall & Mills, 1998). However, further studies that focus on mediational 
processes should include both manipulation checks (e.g., word completion tasks, Arndt et al., 
2004) and mediation checks (e.g., skin conductance). 
The relationship between involvement and mortality salience could be examined in a 
study that manipulates both variables. It appears that mortality salience results in an increase 
in both heuristic and systematic processing, while involvement leads only to greater 
systematic processing. A follow-up study to the possible influence of mortality salience on 
systematic processing certainly is worthy of scholarly attention, given that most TMT studies 
generally show effects only on nonconscious and heuristic processing. 
Solomon et al. (1996) examined mortality salience in a persuasion context but the 
study did not manipulate involvement. All the participants were in a high involvement 
condition, namely, the possibility of comprehensive exams at their college in the near future. 
In the control condition, argument quality had a main effect regardless of whether the 
argument was made by an ivy league professor (high expertise) or a high school senior (low 
expertise). When mortality was made salient, however, argument quality was persuasive only 
when the source was an expert. Because of high involvement, participants should have 
engaged in systematic processing regardless of the expertise of the source. However, the 
mortality salience induction reduced systematic processing when the source was not an 
expert. These findings would need to be replicated, however, as the authors of that study, 
unlike the vast majority of studies that manipulate involvement, did not find a general 
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increase in systematic processing in the control condition despite the personally relevant 
topic.  
 
Worldview as an antecedent variable 
Theorized relationships between worldview and mortality salience, worldview and 
dual modes of information processing, and between worldview and persuasion knowledge 
underscore the need for a clear explication of constructs and their relationships. It is unclear 
if worldview is an antecedent variable that moderates both systematic and heuristic 
processing, or if worldview more properly forms a set of heuristics that is used in heuristic 
processing and which can also influence systematic processing. Defining this issue would 
involve revisiting studies that discussed the influence of antecedent variables such as 
embedded beliefs (Pomerantz et al., 1995) or ideology (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2002). A key 
notion of the heuristic-systematic model is that heuristics can be “cued.” Some variables, 
such as personality, are more properly antecedent to dual-path processing because they 
cannot be cued by a characteristic of a persuasive message. Are the antecedent variables in 
those studies previously formed attitudes or strongly held beliefs? New and unexplained 
results such as those require theoretical specification and a clear delineation of constructs. In 
some formulations of the heuristic-systematic model (Chen & Chaiken, 1999), “theory” was 
held to be a source of heuristics, but in other studies (Pomerantz et al.; Giner-Sorolla et al.), 
embedded core beliefs were considered antecedents.  
Unfortunately, the tests of 2-way interactions of worldview with either argument 
quality or expertise cue were nonsignificant. If worldview is properly an antecedent variable, 
then it should exert influence over both the systematic and the heuristic modes of processing. 
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If worldview is primarily a source of heuristics, then worldview should affect the influence 
of an expertise cue but not of argument quality. It is possible also that, even if worldview 
were mainly a source of heuristics, one’s worldview could bias systematic processing 
indirectly, by influencing the interpretation of heuristic cues which would then bias 
systematic processing. This dissertation’s results concerning the relationship between 
worldview and either argument quality and expertise cue are inconclusive. It appeared that a 
relativist worldview may have influenced evaluations of both argument quality and expertise 
cue. Therefore one should predict that worldview is more properly situated as an antecedent 
of dual-path processing. 
Feldman’s (1999) process framework is necessarily and intentionally open with 
regard to the types of knowledge, such as “values, motives, dispositions” (p. 60), to which 
the framework applies. But the framework might serve as a taxonomy with which to compare 
types of knowledge in terms of their accessibility and diagnosticity, the effect of motivation 
upon them, and their relationship to capacity. For instance, both worldview and persuasion 
knowledge could be classified as antecedent variables. A worldview is chronically accessible 
and diagnostic across many situations, whereas persuasion knowledge becomes accessible 
during persuasion episodes and is relevant only in such persuasion attempts. Worldview 
exerts an influence when one is motivated by accuracy or defense, but persuasion knowledge 
is likely to play a larger role when a person has a defense motivation than when that person’s 
primary motivation is accuracy. These differences could be tested in experiments 
manipulating the type of episode (persuasion or nonpersuasion) and motivation (accuracy or 




 This dissertation can aid research in customization and matching, which amounts to 
tailoring messages to an individual (Kalyanaraman & Sundar, 2006). People report more 
favorable attitudes and more involved behavior when information matches their interests 
(Kalyanaraman & Sundar, 2006). In addition, persuasive messages that are congruent with 
one’s perception of oneself tend to be more effective (Wheeler et al., 2005). If messages 
tailored to one’s self-image are more effective, then it is reasonable to think that messages 
that match one’s worldview would be more effective, as well. To a certain extent, the 




Although the theoretical contributions are several, this dissertation is not without 
practical implications, as well. Worldview appeared to be a significant factor both in how ads 
were evaluated and the likelihood that one might try a product. Most of the research in 
psychographics has concentrated on values and lifestyles, but the role of worldviews seems 
to hold promise in further understanding consumers. Future market research might develop 
efficient means to assess worldviews and probe associations with media use, consumption 
patterns, and demographic variables. This would enable communicators to identify and reach 
groups of people with tailored messages. 
 Several popular prime-time television programs, particularly those in the criminal 
investigation genre, deal with death, which presumably make viewers’ mortality salient. In 
addition, death-related themes are common in television news programs. Based on the results 
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of this dissertation, communicators should realize that viewers’ worldviews might have more 
influence on their heuristic processing than when they are viewing other genres such as 
comedy, home improvement, or game shows. In addition, viewers might engage in more 
systematic processing of the messages with which they are presented. Persuasive commercial 
messages that rely on systematic processing might be more effective if they are presented 




Threats to internal validity 
Limitations other than the ones mentioned above are several. The sample size poses a 
threat to this dissertation’s internal validity, namely statistical validity, and is arguably the 
greatest validity threat. The sample size (N = 149) was sufficient for detecting main effects 
for four independent variables (Cohen, 1992), but far too small for detecting 3-way 
interactions, and likely, 2-way interactions. The discussion of the effect of mortality salience 
on 2-way interactions has been necessarily tentative. This threat can be reduced by 
continuing to recruit participants. 
In addition, the measures of worldview were administered before participants were 
asked to evaluate the ads, which may have led to differential carryover (Feldman & Lynch, 
1988). Asking participants to report on assumptions that are usually tacit may have made 
them more accessible during the subsequent experimental tasks. A future study would need 
to vary the order of administration of the worldview measures in addition to the 
counterbalancing the order of the ads. 
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Threats to external validity 
The particular sample used may have been characterized by moderate involvement. 
The products chosen for the stimulus materials were designed to elicit low levels of 
involvement and replicate earlier studies that employed the same products. However, 
students in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication appeared to be moderately 
involved in the study, not because the particular products elicited high levels of involvement, 
but because the domain of advertising was relevant to them. One can imagine that if one 
were to ask civil engineering students to evaluate bridge designs, a domain of interest to 
engineering students, they would be more involved in that task than mass communication 
students would. However, the participants in this experiment were not told that they were 
part of a small group whose responses would matter greatly, nor did they expect to evaluate 
the advertised product at a later time, nor were the led to believe that the product would be 
introduced in the local area or that they would receive one of the products, techniques that 
have been used to elicit high levels of involvement. The participants were told that their 
responses would be used to refine experimental materials, and, in an effort to minimize the 
possibility of missing data, they were encouraged to answer each questionnaire completely. 
During the experimental sessions, the participants were instructed to view the advertisements 
as they normally would, but the participants were observed referring to the advertisement as 
they filled out the questionnaire related to it. Overall, then, the participants appeared to be 
moderately involved in the study, and one cannot say that the experiment took place under 
conditions of either low or high involvement. 
This presumed moderate level of participants’ involvement is a threat to the study’s 
external validity. That is, students preparing for a career in mass communication may not 
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process advertisements as would the general public. It might be, for example, that the 
observed distinction between worldview and argument quality in predicting Aad and Abrand 
pertained only to mass communication students. Thus, the sample used might threaten 
generalizability. This threat could be reduced by expanding the sample beyond students of 
mass communication. 
 A mono-operation bias from the use of a single worldview instrument, the Attitudes 
About Reality (AAR) scale, might pose a threat to construct validity. The Constructivist 
Assumptions Scale was not employed because of the measure’s low reliability in this 
experiment. However, the AAR has been used in published studies with a variety of samples, 
and there is general agreement that it measures what is termed in this experiment a relativist 
worldview. Even though the scale’s reliability was less than desired, the instrument appeared 
to be a useful measure of a relativist worldview. 
 This dissertation manipulated argument quality, that is, strong and weak arguments. 
However, communicators would hardly purposefully employ weak arguments (Areni & Lutz, 
1988), and the usage of specious arguments, while useful for exploring a proposed theoretical 
relation, jeopardized the experiment’s ecological validity. Further research could explore if 
worldview might moderate dialectic vs. analytic arguments and statistical vs. narrative or 
episodic arguments.  
 
Other limitations 
 This dissertation operationalized only one worldview, one heuristic cue, and 
argument quality. It is to be expected that other worldviews, other cues, and other types of 
arguments might yield different results. Further, the theoretical relationships were explored 
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only in the context of print ads for consumer products, and one might discover relationships 
in other product categories, such as durable goods or services, or in other domains, such as 
political or health communication, or in other modalities, such as television or online media. 
 
Suggestions for future research 
 The limitations discussed offer avenues for further research. Only one worldview was 
operationalized in this dissertation, and depending on the availability of reliable and valid 
measures, one could conduct the experiment with other worldviews. 
 The advertisements employed were limited to personal hygiene products. It remains 
to be seen if the results would vary if one used ads for politicians and political issues (in 
which trait involvement might be higher and worldviews might be more diagnostic), ads for 
durable goods (in which the cost, and presumably state involvement, is higher), or health 
campaigns (either behavior promotion or prevention). Future research could move beyond 
ads to other persuasive messages to consider the impact of worldviews on the perceptions of 
editorials and news articles, as well. 
To reduce the threat to external validity posed by the sample, the study could be 
conducted with students preparing for other career choices or with members of the general 
public to see if the same results hold. 
The mortality salience manipulation appeared to produce results that mirrored those 
of persuasion under conditions of high involvement. A subsequent study could explore this 
possibility by manipulating both involvement and mortality salience to explore their effects 
on the same dependent variables. Further, given that anxiety was proposed as a central 
mediating mechanism in dual-path models of persuasion, physiological measures could be 
102
used to assess the manipulations of mortality salience and involvement, which could be 
contrasted with other forms of arousal such as that arising from physical exercise 
(Sanbonmatsu & Kardes, 1988). 
Research could benefit from further explication of theoretical constructs and their 
relationships. Such an explication should interpret existing research and provide a heuristic 
value for research in the future. To that extent, the results from this dissertation point to 
promising areas of research for future exploration and testing, and further investigation can 
help researchers understand why a single persuasive media message might generate different 
results. In conclusion, to revisit the anecdotal example at the beginning of this dissertation: 
An ad for Martha Stewart’s artificial sweetener that relied on traditional arguments 
and her expertise might appeal to Robert but have no effect on Sandra or Sara. The ad’s 
claims of unbiased laboratory testing and expert experience would be effective to the extent 
that they were congruent with Robert’s assumptions about the possibility of certainty and 
objectivity. To the extent that they were incongruent with Sandra’s and Sara’s assumptions, 
the ad would be ineffective, and to the extent that Sara’s worldview is more accessible to her 
as she processed the message, the ad would be even less effective. Further research into 
worldviews and media effects could reveal why Robert might be persuaded to try Martha 
Stewart’s artificial sweetener and why Sandra and Sara might not. 









Table 1. Hypotheses and research questions. 
 
No. Supported Variables 
Hypothesis or  
Research Question Rationale 
RQ1 
Main effect 
evident for Aad 
and BI 
W
What effect, if any, will a relativist 
worldview have on the global 




H1 Not significant W x C 
A relativist worldview will exhibit an 
inverse relationship to evaluations of 




H2 Not significant W x A 
A relativist worldview will exhibit an 
inverse relationship to evaluations of 





H3 Not significant A x C 
An authority cue and a strong 
argument will interact such that 
evaluations of ads will be stronger 
than those of ads containing the 






RQ2 Not significant  W x A x C 
Will worldview moderate the 





RQ3 No main effect M 
What effect, if any, will mortality 





RQ4 Not significant M x A and M x C
Will mortality salience interact with 
an expertise cue or with argument 









M x A x C
Will mortality salience moderate the 
joint effect of both an expertise cue 





H4 Supported for Aad and BI M x W
Mortality salience and worldview 
will interact such that mortality 








H5 Not significant M x W x C 
Mortality salience, worldview, and an 
expertise cue will interact such that 
participants’ evaluations of ads will 
be lower (higher) than the two-way 




H6 Not significant M x W x A 
Mortality salience, worldview, and 
argument strength will interact such 
that participants’ evaluations of ads 
will be lower (higher) than the two-





Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
 







N Valid 149 149 149 149 149 148
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 1
Mean 4.5134 4.4937 4.5738 5.3540 6.0872 4.5801
Std. Error of Mean .09525 .11016 .15061 .06583 .06773 .04752
Median 4.4444 4.5385 4.5000 5.4048 6.0833 4.6375
Mode 4.28 4.46 4.50 5.55(a) 6.25 4.72
Std. Deviation 1.16265 1.34471 1.83838 .80352 .82671 .57817
Variance 1.352 1.808 3.380 .646 .683 .334
Skewness .003 -.307 -.200 -.416 -.404 -.267
Std. Error of Skewness .199 .199 .199 .199 .199 .199
Kurtosis -.016 -.076 -.652 1.261 1.093 .522
Std. Error of Kurtosis .395 .395 .395 .395 .395 .396
Range 5.89 6.38 7.50 4.95 4.92 3.45
Minimum 1.44 1.00 1.00 2.48 3.42 2.63
Maximum 7.33 7.38 8.50 7.43 8.33 6.08
a Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
 
Table 3. Tests of unidimensionality and reliability. 
 
Measure X2 df Cronbach’s  No. of Items
Need For Closure 1793.924a 819 .88 42 
Constructivist 
Assumptions Scale 142.150
a 54 .59 12 
Attitudes About Reality 1328.309a 740 .78 40 
Aad 625.013a 135 .90 18 
Abrand 315.100a 65 .94 13 
Behavioral Intentions -- -- .50a 2
a = p < .01.
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Table 4. Correlation and covariance. 
 




Correlation 1 -.007 -.020 .010 -.021 -.021 .036
Sig. (2-tailed) . .936 .809 .902 .802 .801 .660




Correlation -.007 1 -.007 -.008 .109 .207(*) .231(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .936 . .934 .921 .184 .011 .005




Correlation -.020 -.007 1 -.138 -.053 -.071 -.050
Sig. (2-tailed) .809 .934 . .095 .524 .387 .541





Correlation .010 -.008 -.138 1 -.194(*) -.050 -.237(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .902 .921 .095 . .018 .545 .004
N 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
5. Aad Pearson Correlation -.021 .109 -.053 -.194(*) 1 .619(**) .568(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .802 .184 .524 .018 . .000 .000
N 149 149 149 148 149 149 149
6. Abrand Pearson Correlation -.021 .207(*) -.071 -.050 .619(**) 1 .550(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .801 .011 .387 .545 .000 . .000




Correlation .036 .231(**) -.050 -.237(**) .568(**) .550(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .660 .005 .541 .004 .000 .000 .
N 149 149 149 148 149 149 149
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5. Slopes of dummy codes and effect codes for Aad.
Dependent Variable: Aad; F(15, 132) = 1.355, (p = .179)








Expertise cue -.432 -.083
(.280) (.395)
A x C .295 -.020
(.592) (.840)
M x C .613 .060
(.264) (.537)
M x A .601 .057
(.262) (.558)
M x W -.564 -.380
(.463) (.036)
C x W -.075 -.154
(.909) (.393)
A x W .012 -.143
(.986) (.426)
M x W x C -.528 .067
(.580) (.710)
M x W x A -.660 .034
(.510) (.851)
W x A x C -.731 .016
(.423) (.928)
M x A x C -.747 -.093
(.337) (.337)
M x W x A x C 1.591 .199
(.269) (.269)
(p values are in parentheses) 
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Table 6. Slopes of dummy codes and effect codes for Abrand.
Dependent Variable: Abrand; F(15, 132) = .678, (p = .803)








Expertise cue -.355 -.100
(.460) (.391)
A x C .640 .096
(.334) (.412)
M x C -.073 -.082
(.912) (.479)
M x A .482 .056
(.453) (.630)
M x W -.532 -.076
(.564) (.725)
C x W .011 .002
(.989) (.992)
A x W .228 .067
(.780) (.756)
M x W x C .433 .126
(.705) (.559)
M x W x A .257 .082
(.831) (.704)
W x A x C -.516 -.111
(.637) (.605)
M x A x C -.514 -.064
(.581) (.581)
M x W x A x C .141 .018
(.935) (.935)
(p values are in parentheses) 
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Table 7. Slopes of dummy codes and effect codes for behavioral intentions.  
 
Dependent Variable: BI; F(15, 132) = 2.451, (p = .003)








Expertise cue -.614 -.154
(.308) (.292)
A x C 1.043 -.115
(.210) (.431)
M x C 1.072 -.108
(.195) (.460)
M x A 1.153 -.087
(.153) (.550)
M x W -.2.575 -.660
(.027) (.016)
C x W -.1.535 -.360
(.123) (.184)
A x W -.756 -.284
(.461) (.294)
M x W x C 2.314 .362
(.109) (.182)
M x W x A 1.061 .049
(.482) (.856)
W x A x C .181 -.171
(.895) (.527)
M x A x C -3.006 -.376
(.011) (.011)
M x W x A x C -.1.731 -.216
(.424) (.424)
(p values are in parentheses) 
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Table 8. Slopes with reverse-coded variables for Aad.
Independent 










Worldview .136 -.428 .148 .061
(.794) (.447) (.735) (.879)
Mortality salience -.423 .423 .178 .190
(.266) (.266) (.637) (.631)
Argument -.042 . 559 .042 .253
(.913) (.132) (.913) (.520)
Expertise cue -.432 .180 -.137 .432
(.280) (.630) (.717) (.280)
A x C .295 -.452 -.295 -.295
(.592) (.409) (.592) (.592)
M x C .613 -.613 -.134 -.613
(.264) (.264) (.807) (.264)
M x A .601 -.601 -.601 -.146
(.262) (.262) (.262) (.795)
M x W -.564 .564 -1.224 -1.092
(.463) (.463) (.059) (.056)
C x W -.075 -.604 -.807 .075
(.909) (.383) (.202) (.909)
A x W .012 -.649 -.012 -.719
(.986) (.379) (.986) (.236)
M x W x C -.528 .528 1.063 .528
(.580) (.580) (.323) (.580)
M x W x A -.660 .660 .660 .931
(.510) (.510) (.510) (.366)
W x A x C -.731 .860 .731 .731
(.423) (.439) (.423) (.423)
M x A x C -.747 .747 .747 .747
(.337) (.337) (.337) (.337)
M x W x A x C 1.591 -1.591 -1.591 -1.591
(.269) (.269) (.269) (.269)
(p values are in parentheses) 
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Table 9. Slopes with reverse-coded variables for Abrand.
Independent 










Worldview -.065 -.597 .164 -.054
(.918) (.377) (.755) (.911)
Mortality salience -.121 .121 .361 -.194
(.791) (.791) (.425) (.683)
Argument .121 .603 -.121 .761
(.794) (.175) (.794) (.108)
Expertise cue -.355 -.427 .285 .355
(.460) (.343) (.531) (.460)
A x C .640 .125 -.640 -.640
(.334) (.848) (.334) (.334)
M x C -.073 .073 -.587 .073
(.912) (.912) (.374) (.912)
M x A .482 -.482 -.482 -.033
(.453) (.453) (.453) (.961)
M x W -.532 .532 -.275 -.099
(.564) (.564) (.722) (.885)
C x W .011 .444 -.505 -.011
(.989) (.593) (.504) (.989)
A x W .228 .485 -.228 -.288
(.780) (.583) (.780) (.692)
M x W x C .433 -.433 .574 -.433
(.705) (.705) (.656) (.705)
M x W x A .257 -.257 -.257 .397
(.831) (.831) (.831) (.748)
W x A x C -.516 -.376 .516 .516
(.637) (.778) (.637) (.637)
M x A x C -.514 .514 .514 .514
(.581) (.581) (.581) (.581)
M x W x A x C .141 -.141 -.141 -.141
(.935) (.935) (.935) (.935)
(p values are in parentheses) 
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Table 10. Slopes with reverse-coded variables for behavioral intentions. 
 
Independent 










Worldview .775 -1.800 .019 -.759
(.325) (.035) (.977) (.209)
Mortality salience -.179 .179 .974 .892
(.754) (.754) (.087) (.135)
Argument .461 1.614 -.461 1.504
(.429) (.004) (.429) (.012)
Expertise cue -.614 .458 .429 .614
(.308) (.418) (.453) (.308)
A x C 1.043 -1.963 -1.043 -1.043
(.210) (.018) (.210) (.210)
M x C 1.072 -1.072 -1.935 -1.072
(.195) (.195) (.021) (.195)
M x A 1.153 -1.153 -1.153 -1.853
(.153) (.153) (.153) (.030)
M x W -2.575 2.575 -1.514 -.261
(.027) (.027) (.121) (.760)
C x W -1.535 .779 -1.354 1.535
(.123) (.454) (.155) (.123)
A x W -.756 .305 .756 -.575
(.461) (.783) (.461) (.528)
M x W x C 2.314 -2.314 .583 -2.314
(.109) (.109) (.718) (.109)
M x W x A 1.061 -1.061 -1.061 -.670
(.482) (.482) (.482) (.665)
W x A x C .181 -1.550 -.181 -.181
(.895) (.354) (.895) (.895)
M x A x C -3.006 3.006 3.006 3.006
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.011)
M x W x A x C -1.731 1.731 1.731 1.731
(.424) (.424) (.424) (.424)
(p values are in parentheses) 
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Worldview -1.076 -1.031 -.658 -.820
(.025) (.011) (.148) (.261)
Mortality salience -.178 -.190 .044 -.044
(.637) (.631) (.914) (.914)
Argument -.559 .107 -.253 -.107
(.132) (.791) (.520) (.791)
Expertise cue -.271 -.180 .137 .271
(.496) (.630) (.717) (.496)
A x C .452 .452 .295 -.452
(.409) (.409) (.592) (.409)
M x C .134 .613 .134 -.134
(.807) (.264) (.807) (.807)
M x A .601 .146 .146 -.146
(.262) (.795) (.795) (.795)
M x W 1.224 1.092 -.161 .161
(.059) (.056) (.851) (.851)
C x W .257 .604 .807 -.257
(.768) (.383) (.202) (.768)
A x W .649 .212 .719 -.212
(.379) (.799) (.236) (.799)
M x W x C -1.063 -.528 -1.063 1.063
(.323) (.580) (.323) (.323)
M x W x A -.660 -.931 -.931 .931
(.510) (.366) (.366) (.366)
W x A x C -.860 -.860 -.731 .860
(.439) (.439) (.423) (.439)
M x A x C -.747 -.747 -.747 .747
(.337) (.337) (.337) (.337)
M x W x A x C 1.591 1.591 1.591 -1.591
(.269) (.269) (.269) (.269)
(p values are in parentheses) 
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Worldview -.112 -.152 -.342 -.043
(.845) (.752) (.530) (.961)
Mortality salience -.361 .194 -.226 .226
(.425) (.683) (.638) (.638)
Argument -.603 .729 -.761 -.729
(.175) (.134) (.108) (.134)
Expertise cue -.302 .427 -.285 .302
(.527) (.343) (.531) (.527)
A x C -.125 -.125 .640 .125
(.848) (.848) (.334) (.848)
M x C .587 -.073 .587 -.587
(.374) (.912) (.374) (.374)
M x A .482 .033 .033 -.033
(.453) (.961) (.961) (.961)
M x W .275 .099 .299 -.299
(.722) (.885) (.722) (.772)
C x W .069 -.444 .505 -.069
(.948) (.593) (.504) (.948)
A x W -.485 .110 .228 -.110
(.583) (.913) (.692) (.913)
M x W x C -.574 .433 -.574 .574
(.656) (.705) (.656) (.656)
M x W x A .257 -.397 -.397 .397
(.831) (.748) (.748) (.748)
W x A x C .376 .376 -.516 -.376
(.778) (.778) (.637) (.778)
M x A x C -.514 -.514 -.514 .514
(.581) (.581) (.581) (.581)
M x W x A x C .141 .141 .141 -.141
(.935) (.935) (.935) (.935)
(p values are in parentheses) 
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Worldview -1.495 -1.021 -1.335 -2.266
(.038) (.093) (.052) (.040)
Mortality salience -.974 -.892 -.961 .961
(.087) (.135) (.113) (.113)
Argument -1.614 -.349 -1.504 .349
(.004) (.565) (.012) (.565)
Expertise cue -1.506 -.458 -.429 1.506
(.013) (.418) (.453) (.013)
A x C 1.963 1.963 1.043 -1.963
(.018) (.018) (.210) (.018)
M x C 1.935 1.072 1.935 -1.935
(.021) (.195) (.021) (.021)
M x A 1.153 1.853 1.853 -1.853
(.153) (.030) (.030) (.030)
M x W 1.514 .261 -.931 .931
(.121) (.760) (.471) (.556)
C x W -.771 -.779 1.354 .771
(.556) (.454) (.155) (.123)
A x W -.305 -1.245 .575 1.245
(.783) (.321) (.528) (.321)
M x W x C -.583 2.314 -.583 .583
(.718) (.109) (.718) (.718)
M x W x A 1.061 .670 .670 -.670
(.482) (.665) (.665) (.665)
W x A x C 1.550 1.550 .181 -1.550
(.354) (.354) (.895) (.354)
M x A x C -3.006 -3.006 -3.006 3.006
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.011)
M x W x A x C -.1.731 -1.731 -1.731 1.731
(.424) (.424) (.424) (.424)
(p values are in parentheses) 
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Table 14. Regression of dependent variable Aad; F(15, 132) = 1.355, (p = .179). 
 
B S. E. Z t p Partial [2
(Constant) 4.508 .097 46.537 .000 .943
Worldview -.458 .179 -.228 -2.558 .012 .047
Mortality 
salience -.002 .097 -.001 -.016 .987 .000
Argument 
quality .109 .097 .094 1.131 .260 .009
Expertise cue -.083 .097 -.071 -.853 .395 .006
A x C -.020 .097 -.017 -.203 .840 .000
M x C .060 .097 .052 .618 .537 .003
M x A .057 .097 .049 .587 .558 .003
M x W -.380 .179 -.189 -2.122 .036 .033
W x C -.154 .179 -.076 -.858 .393 .006
W x A -.143 .179 -.071 -.798 .426 .005
M x W x C .067 .179 .033 .373 .710 .001
M x W x A .034 .179 .017 .189 .851 .000
W x A x C .016 .179 .008 .090 .928 .000
M x A x C -.093 .097 -.080 -.964 .337 .007
W x M x A x C .199 .179 .098 1.110 .269 .009
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Table 15. Regression of dependent variable Abrand; F(15, 132) = .678, (p = .803). 
 
B S. E. Z t p Partial [2
(Constant) 4.490 .116 38.620 .000 .919
Worldview -.150 .215 -.064 -.698 .487 .004
Mortality salience -.023 .116 -.017 -.194 .847 .000
Argument quality .277 .116 .206 2.382 .019 .041
Expertise cue -.100 .116 -.074 -.860 .391 .006
A x C .096 .116 .071 .823 .412 .005
M x C -.082 .116 -.061 -.710 .479 .004
M x A .056 .116 .042 .483 .630 .002
M x W -.076 .215 -.033 -.353 .725 .001
W x C .002 .215 .001 .010 .992 .000
W x A .067 .215 .029 .311 .756 .001
M x W x C .126 .215 .054 .586 .559 .003
M x W x A .082 .215 .035 .380 .704 .001
W x A x C -.111 .215 -.048 -.518 .605 .002
M x A x C -.064 .116 -.048 -.553 .581 .002
W x M x A x C .018 .215 .007 .082 .935 .000
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Table 16. Regression of dependent variable: BI; F(15, 132) = 2.451, (p = .003). 
 
B S. E. Z t p Partial [2
(Constant) 4.514 .146 30.952 .000 .879
Worldview -.985 .270 -.309 -3.652 .000 .092
Mortality salience .091 .146 .049 .623 .534 .003
Argument quality .404 .146 .220 2.769 .006 .054
Expertise cue -.154 .146 -.084 -1.058 .292 .009
A x C -.115 .146 -.063 -.789 .431 .005
M x C -.108 .146 -.059 -.740 .460 .004
M x A -.087 .146 -.048 -.600 .550 .003
M x W -.660 .270 -.207 -2.448 .016 .043
W x C -.360 .270 -.112 -1.335 .184 .013
W x A -.284 .270 -.089 -1.053 .294 .008
M x W x C .362 .270 .113 1.343 .182 .013
M x W x A .049 .270 .015 .181 .856 .000
W x A x C -.171 .270 -.054 -.635 .527 .003
M x A x C -.376 .146 -.204 -2.578 .011 .048








Figure 1. Comparison of worldview to analogous constructs. 
 
Theorist Construct/ Metaphor 
Attributes/ 
Characteristics 
Koltko-Rivera Worldview Core dimensions 
Wittgenstein Worldpicture/ Lens; Riverbed Icons, narratives 
Kuhn Paradigm exemplars 
Lippmann Pseudoenvironment/ Pictures in our heads stereotypes 
Figure 2. Counterbalanced order. 
 
1 (R) MS NC CAS AAR AdA0 DV AdB1 DV F 
2 (R) TV NC CAS AAR AdA0 DV AdB1 DV F 
3 (R) MS NC CAS AAR Ada0 DV Adb1 DV F 
4 (R) TV NC CAS AAR Ada0 DV Adb1 DV F 
5 (R) MS NC CAS AAR AdB0 DV AdA1 DV F 
6 (R) TV NC CAS AAR AdB0 DV AdA1 DV F 
7 (R) MS NC CAS AAR Adb0 DV Ada1 DV F 
8 (R) TV NC CAS AAR Adb0 DV Ada1 DV F 
9 (R) MS NC CAS AAR AdA1 DV AdB0 DV F 
10 (R) TV NC CAS AAR AdA1 DV AdB0 DV F 
11 (R) MS NC CAS AAR Ada1 DV Adb0 DV F 
12 (R) TV NC CAS AAR Ada1 DV Adb0 DV F 
13 (R) MS NC CAS AAR AdB1 DV AdA0 DV F 
14 (R) TV NC CAS AAR AdB1 DV AdA0 DV F 
15 (R) MS NC CAS AAR Adb1 DV Ada0 DV F 
16 (R) TV NC CAS AAR Adb1 DV Ada0 DV F 
 
Note: 
Number = counterbalanced sequence; MS = mortality salience manipulation; TV = control 
manipulation (watching television); NC = Need for Closure Scale; CAS = Constructivist 
Assumptions Scale; AAR = Attitudes About Reality Scale; Ad subscripts: A = “Ritual” ad; B 
= “Quest” ad; upper-case letter = strong argument; lower-case letter = weak argument; 1 = 
expertise cue; 0 = no expertise cue; DV = battery of dependent measures and manipulation 
checks (Aad, Abrand, behavioral intentions, perceived argument quality, perceived expertise, 
perceived credibility); F = final manipulation (finding a winning lottery ticket). 
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Figure 3. Main effect of worldview on dependent variables. 
 
Note: Solid line = Aad; dotted line = Abrand; dashed line = behavioral intentions. 
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Figure 4a. Graph of 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and expertise cue for 
Aad.
Control 
Note: Solid line = present; dotted line = absent 
 
123
Figure 4b. Graph of 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and expertise cue for 
Aad.
Mortality salience 
Note: Solid line = present; dotted line = absent 
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Figure 5a. Graph of 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and expertise cue for 
Abrand.
Control 
Note: Solid line = present; dotted line = absent 
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Figure 5b. Graph of 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and expertise cue for 
Abrand.
Mortality salience 
Note: Solid line = present; dotted line = absent 
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Note: Solid line = present; dotted line = absent 
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Note: Solid line = present; dotted line = absent 
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Figure 7a. Graph of 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and argument quality 
for Aad.
Control 
Note: Solid line = strong; dotted line = weak 
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Figure 7b. Graph of 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and argument quality 
for Aad.
Mortality salience 
Note: Solid line = strong; dotted line = weak 
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Figure 8a. Graph of 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and argument quality 
for Abrand.
Control 
Note: Solid line = strong; dotted line = weak 
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Figure 8b. Graph of 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and argument quality 
for Abrand.
Mortality salience 
Note: Solid line = strong; dotted line = weak 
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Figure 9a. Graph of 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and argument quality 
for behavioral intentions. 
 
Control 
Note: Solid line = strong; dotted line = weak 
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Figure 9b. Graph of 3-way interaction of mortality salience, worldview, and argument quality 
for behavioral intentions. 
 
Mortality salience 
Note: Solid line = strong; dotted line = weak 
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Figure 10a. Three-way interaction of expertise cue, argument quality, and mortality salience 
for Aad.
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Figure 10b. Three-way interaction of expertise cue, argument quality, and mortality salience 
for Aad.
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Figure 11a. Three-way interaction of expertise cue, argument quality, and mortality salience 
for Abrand.
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Figure 11b. Three-way interaction of expertise cue, argument quality, and mortality salience 
for Abrand.
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Figure 12a. Three-way interaction of expertise cue, argument quality, and mortality salience 
for behavioral intentions.  
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Figure 12b. Three-way interaction of expertise cue, argument quality, and mortality salience 
for behavioral intentions.  
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Figure 13a. Three-way interaction of worldview, argument quality, and expertise cue for Aad.
No cue 





















R Sq Linear = 0.06
R Sq Linear = 5.762E-4
 
Note: Solid line = strong; dashed line = weak 
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Figure 13b. Three-way interaction of worldview, argument quality, and expertise cue for Aad.
Cue 






















R Sq Linear = 0.099
R Sq Linear = 0.059
 
Note: Solid line = strong; dashed line = weak 
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Figure 14a. Three-way interaction of worldview, argument quality, and expertise cue for 
Abrand.
No cue 























R Sq Linear = 3.176E-4
R Sq Linear = 0.014
 
Note: Solid line = strong; dashed line = weak 
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Figure 14b. Three-way interaction of worldview, argument quality, and expertise cue for 
Abrand.
Cue 
























R Sq Linear = 0.006
R Sq Linear = 0.004
 
Note: Solid line = strong; dashed line = weak 
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R Sq Linear = 0.055
R Sq Linear = 0.012
 
Note: Solid line = strong; dashed line = weak 
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R Sq Linear = 0.14
R Sq Linear = 0.074
 
Note: Solid line = strong; dashed line = weak 
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Figure 16. Mortality salience and expertise cue for Aad, given weak arguments. 
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Figure 17. Mortality salience and expertise cue for Abrand, given weak arguments. 
 
148




Figure 19. Interaction of mortality salience and argument quality for Aad, given no cue. 
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Figure 20. Interaction of mortality salience and argument quality for Abrand, given no cue. 
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Figure 21. Interaction of mortality salience and argument quality for behavioral intentions, 
given no cue. 
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Figure 22. Interaction of mortality salience and worldview for Aad.
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 23. Interaction of mortality salience and worldview for Abrand.
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 24. Interaction of mortality salience and worldview for behavioral intentions. 
 
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 25a. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when cue is absent for Aad.
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 25b. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when cue is present for Aad.
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 26a. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when cue is absent for Abrand.
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 26b. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when cue is present for Abrand.
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
 
159
Figure 27a. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when cue is absent for behavioral 
intentions. 
 
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 27b. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when cue is present for 
behavioral intentions. 
 
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 28a. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when arguments are weak for 
Aad.
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 28b. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when arguments are strong for 
Aad.
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 29a. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when arguments are weak for 
Abrand.
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 29b. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when arguments are strong for 
Abrand.
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 30a. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when arguments are weak for 
behavioral intentions. 
 
Note: Solid line = mortality salience; dotted line = control 
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Figure 30b. Interaction of worldview and mortality salience when arguments are strong for 
behavioral intentions. 
 













You are being asked to evaluate two magazine advertisements and record your impressions 
about each one.  
 
It is important to be as honest as you can and go with your “first impression” or “gut 
reaction.” 
 
Please view the advertisement as you normally would. After you view each advertisement, 
you will be asked to evaluate it. Please record your answers in the answer booklet. Please 
evaluate the first advertisement before proceeding to the second one.
Remember: 
please record your responses regarding the first ad before you view the second ad. 
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Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you. 
 
[CONTROL] 
[Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of watching television arouses in you.] 
 
Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die 
and once you are physically dead. 
 
[CONTROL] 
[Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think happens to you physically as you watch 
television.] 
Please continue to the next page. 
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In this section, please rate your level of agreement with the following statements on a scale 
from 1 to 9, where “1” means you strongly disagree and “9” means you strongly agree.
Notice that some of the questions are opposite the others, so please read each statement 





1. I think that having clear rules and order at work is 
essential for success. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. Even after I’ve made up my mind about something, I 
am always eager to consider a different opinion. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3. I don’t like situations that are uncertain. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. I dislike questions that are uncertain. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5. I like to have friends who are unpredictable. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits 
my temperament. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
7. When dining out, I like to go to places where I have 
been before so that I know what to expect. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
8. I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the 
reason why an event occurred in my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
9. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what 
everyone else in a group believes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10. I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
11. I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing 
what I can expect from it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
12. When I go shopping, I have difficulty deciding 
exactly what it is that I want. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
13. When faced with a problem I usually see the one best 
solution very quickly. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
14. When I am confused about an important issue, I feel 
very upset. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
15. I tend to put off making important decisions until the 
last possible moment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
16. I usually make important decisions quickly and 
confidently. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
17. I would describe myself as indecisive. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
18. I think it is fun to change plans at the last moment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
19. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation 
without knowing what might happen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
20. My personal space is usually messy and 
disorganized. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
21. In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is 
right and which is wrong. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
22. I tend to struggle with most decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
23. I believe that orderliness and organization are among 
the most important characteristics of good student. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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24. When considering most conflict situations, I can 
usually see how both sides could be right. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
25. I don’t like to be with people who are capable of 
unexpected actions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
26. I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I 
know what to expect from them. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
27. I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks 
clearly stated objectives and requirements. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
28. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many 
different opinions on the issue as possible. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
29. I like to know what people are thinking all the time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
30. I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean 
many different things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
31. It’s annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem 
to make up his or her mind. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
32. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables 
me to enjoy life more. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
33. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
34. I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are 
very different from my own. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
35. I like to have a place for everything and everything in 
its place. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
36. I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or 
intention is unclear to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
37. When trying to solve a problem I often see so many 
possible options that it’s confusing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
38. I always see many possible solutions to problems I 
face. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
39. I’d rather know bad news than stay in a state of 
uncertainty. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
40. I do not usually consult many different opinions 
before forming my own view. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
41. I dislike unpredictable situations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
42. I dislike the routine aspects of my schoolwork. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Please continue to the next page. 
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You will find a series of general statements listed below. Each represents a commonly held 
opinion, and there are no right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree with some 
items and agree with others. We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with such matters of opinion.  
For this particular questionnaire, it is best if you answer quickly and go with your first 
impression or “gut reaction.” Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by 
circling the number corresponding to your feelings, where “1” means you strongly disagree 





1. Facts speak for themselves. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. Our understanding of the natural, physical world is 
influenced by our social values. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3. Scientific facts are universal truths; they do not change 
over time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. Nothing is really good or bad, it always depends upon 
how we think about it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5. What we see with our own eyes is influenced by our 
expectations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6. Truth is relative. What is true at one point in time may 
not be true at another. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
7. Scientific investigations are objective; they are not 
influenced by social values. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
8. We never see the world as it really is. What we 
perceive depends on what we believe and want to see. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
9. Our understanding of human behavior is influenced by 
our social values. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10. Nothing is really important by itself. A thing is 
important if we think it is. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
11. Seeing is believing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
12. The more people know, the more they are bound to 
feel that they cannot be completely sure about anything. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Please continue to the next page 
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Again, it is best if you answer quickly and go with your first impression or “gut reaction.”
We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree with these matters of opinion, 





1. Who has power is a central issue in 
understanding how society works. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. It is not good for a person to refuse to go along 
with the rules of society. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3. Science has underestimated the extent to which 
genes affect human behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. Sometimes going against society’s rules is 
necessary for social change to occur. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5. The way scientists choose to investigate problems 
is influenced by the values of their society. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6. If one works hard at solving a problem, one can 
usually find the answer. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
7. If everyone learns what is important to them, the 
world will take care of itself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
8. Most sex differences have an evolutionary 
purpose. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
9. People who achieve success usually deserve it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10. The saying “You shall know the truth and the 
truth shall set you free” is still valid today. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
11. The more technology we develop, the better our 
science will be. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
12. Accidental solutions to problems are very rare. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
13. At the present time, people are recognized for 
their achievements regardless of their race, sex, or 
social class. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
14. People cannot be trained to be creative—they 
are either born that way or not. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
15. People who demand social change are usually 
those who have been unsuccessful. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
16. The facts of science change over time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
17. The United States is the most equal society in 
the world. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
18. Once a scientific fact has been discovered, it 
remains part of that science from then on. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
19. We communicate much more information to 
each other than we are aware of doing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
20. Personality characteristics account for the most 
differences in human behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
21. Important ideas are most likely to originate from 
prestigious institutions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
22. Effort can often make up for a lack of talent in 
an area. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
23. It is more important to be liked than to be 
powerful. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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24. Biological sex, sex role, and sexual preference 
are highly related to each other in normal people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
25. The mother-infant relationship is a key to 
understanding later adult development. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
26. People who are part of minority groups should 
not have to worry about other people in these 
groups who are less successful than they are. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
27. Unconscious motivations are very important for 
understanding human behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
28. Deviance is not a particular kind of behavior but 
a perception by others that behavior is socially 
unacceptable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
29. Society must protect itself from those who do 
not accept its rules. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
30. Famous people’s research is frequently 
mentioned by less well known others in order to 
lend prestige to their own findings. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
31. Most people would cooperate with each other if 
only they understood that everyone would benefit 
by such behavior. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
32. Scientific merit is determined by the excellence 
of the work done. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
33. It is important to decrease the distance between 
the “real world” and the scientific laboratory. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
34. A great deal can be learned about human 
behavior by studying animals. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
35. Those who go against society’s rules during one 
period of history are often found to be leaders of 
social change later on. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
36. The acceptability of evidence is related to the 
importance of the person who discovers it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
37. It is better not to know too much about things 
that cannot be changed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
38. Biological differences limit the degree to which 
men and women can learn to be similar to each 
other. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
39. People who have the least to lose in a 
relationship will be more likely to get their way in 
that relationship. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
40. Most social problems are solved by a few very 
qualified individuals. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Thank you. This is the end of the section on background questions. 
 
Please continue to the next study. 
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You are being asked to evaluate two magazine advertisements and record your impressions 
about each one.  
 
It is important to be as honest as you can and go with your “first impression” or “gut 
reaction.” 
 
Please view the advertisement as you normally would. After you view each advertisement, 
you will be asked to evaluate it. Please record your answers in the answer booklet. Please 
evaluate the first advertisement before proceeding to the second one.
Remember: 
please record your responses regarding the first ad before you view the second ad. 
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This section pertains to your perceptions of the advertisement you just viewed. Please record 
your evaluations based on the following scales. Notice that some of the scales are reversed, 
so please read both ends of the scale carefully before making your choice. 
 
A. Please express your attitudes toward the advertisement.
Appealing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unappealing 
Informative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Uninformative 
Unexciting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Exciting 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Interesting 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Bad 
Pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unpleasant 
Dull 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dynamic 
Clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Confusing 
Unattractive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Attractive 
Favorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unfavorable 
Likable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dislikable 
Ordinary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Sophisticated 
Persuasive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unpersuasive 
Low Quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High Quality 
Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Positive 
Agreeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Disagreeable 
Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Valuable 
Useful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Useless 
B. Please express your attitudes toward the brand.
Appealing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unappealing 
Unexciting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Exciting 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Bad 
Pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unpleasant 
Dull 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dynamic 
Unattractive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Attractive 
Favorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unfavorable 
Likable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dislikable 
Ordinary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Sophisticated 
Low Quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High Quality 
Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Positive 
Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Valuable 
Useful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Useless 
C. Please express your attitudes toward the product.
Not at all  
Likely 
 Very                 
Likely
1. Rate the probability that you would purchase 
this product. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. Rate the probability that you would try a free sample  
of this product. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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 D. Please rate the strength of the advertisement’s arguments. 
 
Strong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Weak 
Persuasive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unpersuasive 
Unconvincing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Convincing 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Bad 
Logical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Illogical 






1. The company has special expertise in this product 
area. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. The company is an authoritative source of product 
information. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3. The company is an unreliable source of product 
information. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. The company is knowledgeable in this product area.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
This section assesses the credibility of the advertisement you just viewed. Please rate your 
level of agreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 to 9, with “1” being 





1. I would trust information in the advertisement. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. I believe the advertisement to be credible.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3. I found the information featured in the advertisement 
to be of high quality. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4. I found the information featured in the advertisement 
to be accurate. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5. I found the information featured in the advertisement 
to be reliable. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6. I found the information featured in the advertisement 
to be believable. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Very  
Little 
 Very                   
Much
1. How much attention did you pay to the ad content? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2. How familiar were you with the ad you just viewed?  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9





Please answer some brief background questions. 
Your responses are completely confidential. 
 
1. In what year were you born? ____________ 
2. What is your major? __________________ 
 
Please circle one 
3. Gender:       Female Male 
4. Ethnicity:  African-American Asian   Caucasian 
 Hispanic/Latino Native American Other 
 
5. Have you taken a course in process and effects of 
 mass communication?    No Yes 
6. Have you taken a course in advertising copy writing? No Yes 
7. Have you taken a course in design (e.g., promotion  
 design, publication design)?    No Yes 
 
In your own words, please write what you believe to be the purpose of this study. 
 
Please write any comments for the experimenter in the space below. 
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Please briefly describe the emotions that finding a winning lottery ticket for $1 million would 
arouse in you. 
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